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Climate Engineering Field Research: The
Favorable Setting of International
Environmental Law
Jesse Reynolds*
Abstract
As forecasts for climate change and its impacts have become more
dire, climate engineering proposals have come under increasing
consideration and are presently moving toward field trials. This article
examines the relevant international environmental law, distinguishing
between climate engineering research and deployment. It also emphasizes
the climate change context of these proposals and the enabling function of
law. Extant international environmental law generally favors such field
tests, in large part because, even though field trials may present uncertain
risks to humans and the environment, climate engineering may reduce the
greater risks of climate change. Notably, this favorable legal setting is
present in those multilateral environmental agreements whose subject
matter is closest to climate engineering. This favorable legal setting is also,
in part, due to several relevant multilateral environmental agreements that
encourage scientific research and technological development, along with
the fact that climate engineering research is consistent with principles of
international environmental law. Existing international law, however,
imposes some procedural duties on States who are responsible for climate
engineering field research as well as a handful of particular prohibitions
and constraints.
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I. Introduction
Efforts thus far to reduce the risks from anthropogenic climate
change have been disappointing. In response, some scientists are
investigating intentional, large-scale interventions in global chemical,
physical, and biological systems in order to reduce climate risks.1 These
proposed “climate engineering” or “geoengineering” methods are
controversial, in part, because some of them pose risks of their own to
humans and the environment.2 International environmental law plays an
important role in any discussion of climate engineering because some

1.
See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE
CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS (June 7, 2013) [hereinafter IPCC, PHYSICAL
SCIENCE], available at http://www.climatechange2013.org/report/ (examining the potential
of climate engineering as potential additional responses to climate change).
2.
See id. at § TS.5.6 (discussing the risks associated with climate engineering and
carbon dioxide reduction).
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climate engineering techniques may cause trans-boundary damage or
damage in areas beyond state jurisdiction.3
This article examines how existing international environmental law
may regulate and influence field testing of climate engineering. In its
examination, this article (1) distinguishes between climate engineering field
research and deployment, focusing on the former due to its urgency; (2)
considers climate engineering proposals in the context of climate change;
and (3) emphasizes the enabling function of law.
Some multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) suggest that
States seeking to protect the environment should balance the risks
associated with climate engineering field tests with the reduction of climate
change risks. Typically, this balance favors climate engineering field
research. Although none of the MEAs address climate engineering directly,
it is notable that those whose content is the closest to addressing climate
engineering are among those that encourage its research. A second reason
for this favorable legal setting is that many MEAs call upon States to
engage in scientific research and technological development. Finally,
climate engineering research is consistent with principles of international
environmental law such as precaution, polluter pays, and common but
differentiated responsibilities. Concurrently, existing laws impose a number
of procedural duties, and they constrain or prohibit specific actions.
Part II of this article describes climate change and climate
engineering along with some of the associated risks. Part III frames the
discussion by considering several relevant legal topics. The subsequent
three Parts examine binding MEAs, nonbinding MEAs, and customary
international law, respectively. In the final Part, I conclude that the current
international framework is favorable to future climate engineering research,
although, there are a handful of unresolved issues.
II. Climate Change and Climate Engineering
Climate change is among the greatest challenges facing society
today.4 Humans are increasing the atmospheric concentrations of so-called
greenhouse gases—especially carbon dioxide—which let light in but

3.
See id. (noting that in order for climate engineering methods to be effective, they
need to be implemented on a large scale in order for the techniques to be effective).
4.
See Ban Ki-moon, Sec’y-Gen., United Nations, Remarks at the Thirty-ninth
Plenary Assembly of the World Federation of United Nations Associations (Aug. 10, 2009),
available
at
http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/statments_full.a
sp?statID=555 (“[Climate change] is, simply, the greatest collective challenge we face as a
human family.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE,
AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
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obstruct the escape of heat.5 Although most of these gases occur naturally,
activities such as fossil fuel combustion and land use changes result in
emission rates that are higher than their natural removal rate, leading to
their accumulation in the Earth’s atmosphere.6 As the forecasts for climate
change and its effects have become direr, a wider spectrum of responses has
been considered. Initially, international responses focused on the abatement
of greenhouse gas emissions.7 The leading vehicle for global cooperative
abatement, the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, however, may not have actually reduced
emissions.8 There are several additional reasons for pessimism looking
forward. First, fossil fuel combustion is essential to economic activity, and
its reduction carries large costs.9 Moreover, most current emissions are, and
most future emissions will be, produced by developing countries that
understandably insist on economic development and improvements in
living conditions.10 Second, because the negative effects of greenhouse
gases will occur decades after they are emitted and independently from
their location, their abatement presents an enormous global and
intergenerational collective action problem.11 In any international
abatement agreement, each country is asked to undertake costly actions to
prevent damage that will occur mostly in distant locations and in the
future.12 Such steps are politically unpopular and it is tempting to free-ride

5.
See IPCC, PHYSICAL SCIENCE, supra note 1, § 1.2.2 (describing the effects created
by certain gases and stating that “[h]umans enhance the greenhouse effect directly by
emitting greenhouse gases”).
6.
See id. § TS.3.2 (“Human activity leads to change in the atmosphere composition
either directly (via emissions of gases or particles) or indirectly (via atmospheric
chemistry).”).
7.
See E. Lisa F. Schipper, Conceptual History of Adaptation in the UNFCCC
Process, 15 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT’L ENVTL. L. 82, 82–83 (describing the focus on
emission reductions in early international climate negotiations).
8.
See Quirin Schiermeier, Hot Air, 491 NATURE 656, 656 (2012) (stating that most
Kyoto targets were met only due to economic downturns in Eastern Europe in the 1990s and
worldwide in the late 2000s, and were more than offset by emission increases in countries
without commitments under the Kyoto Protocol).
9.
See WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, A QUESTION OF BALANCE: WEIGHING THE OPTIONS ON
GLOBAL WARMING POLICIES 82 (2008) (estimating that both climate damage and emissions
abatement costs are on the order of trillions to tens of trillions of dollars).
10.
See INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2013 § 2 (Nov.
12, 2013) (looking at global trends in energy usage through 2035).
11.
See IPCC, PHYSICAL SCIENCE, supra note 1, § 12.5.2 (describing how the Earth’s
surface temperatures lag behind changes in greenhouse gas concentrations).
12.
See David G. Victor, On the Regulation of Geoengineering, 24 OXFORD REV.
ECON. POL’Y 322, 324 (2008) (“With today’s technologies, achieving a deep cut in
emissions will require costly investment for uncertain benefits that accrue mainly in the
distant future—attributes that tend not to be rewarding for politicians.”); see also
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or to defect from these agreements.13 Third, because excess carbon dioxide
naturally leaves the atmosphere slowly, emission reductions would merely
delay a given amount of climate change.14 Therefore, avoiding dangerous
climate change requires radical changes in energy systems and net negative
emissions.15
The second international response to the problem of climate change
has been adaptation to the changing climate conditions.16 Adaptation was
initially decried as “a kind of laziness, an arrogant faith in our ability to
react in time to save our skin,” but is now considered another legitimate
response.17 The capacity for adaptation is also limited.18 It is more urgent in

NORDHAUS, supra note 9, at 4–6 (describing the impact that climate change will have across
the globe).
13.
See Twelve Years of the Public’s Top Priorities, THE PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR
THE PEOPLE AND THE PRESS (Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.people-press.org/interactives/toppriorities/ (demonstrating that the issue of global warning has been at or near the bottom of
United States public policy priorities since its inclusion in 2007) (on file with the
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
14.
See IPCC, PHYSICAL SCIENCE, supra note 1, § 12.5.2 (“[P]ast emissions commit us
to persistent warming for hundreds of years . . . .”).
15.
See Ken Caldeira, Climate Sensitivity Uncertainty and the Need for Energy
Without CO2 Emission, 299 SCIENCE 2052, 2053 (2003) (“To achieve stabilization at a 2°C
warming, we would need to install ~900 ± 500 [megawatts] of carbon emissions-free power
generating capacity each day over the next 50 years. This is roughly the equivalent of a large
carbon emissions-free power plant becoming functional somewhere in the world every
day.”); IPCC, PHYSICAL SCIENCE, supra note 1, § SPM E.1, 12.3.1.3 (describing how the
only Representative Concentration Pathway scenario considered by the IPCC under which
global surface temperature change is likely remain below two degrees Celsius—an
internationally agreed-upon target—through the end of the century is RCP2.6, which
assumes net negative emissions).
16.
See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014:
IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, FINAL DRAFTS (ACCEPTED) § 14.1 (Oct. 28,
2013) [hereinafter IPCC, IMPACTS], available at http://ipcc-wg2.gov/AR5/report/final-drafts/
(“Human and natural systems have a capacity to cope with adverse circumstances, but with
continuing climate change, adaptation will be needed to maintain this capacity.”);
Adaptation Overview, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/impactsadaptation/adapt-overview.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2014) (“‘Adaptation’ refers to efforts
by society or ecosystems to prepare for or adjust to future climate change.”) (on file with the
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
17.
See AL GORE, EARTH IN THE BALANCE: ECOLOGY AND THE HUMAN SPIRIT 240
(1993) (“Believing that we can adapt to just about anything is ultimately a kind of laziness,
an arrogant faith in our ability to react in time to save our skin.”); Schipper, supra note 7, at
91 (“Since 2002, a complementary approach between adaptation and mitigation has gained
support, with the acknowledgement that adaptation and mitigation are not
alternatives . . . .”).
18.
See IPCC, IMPACTS, supra note 16, § 16.4 (noting that, beyond a certain point,
adaptive efforts fail to provide “an acceptable level of security from risks”).
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developing countries, which are more vulnerable to climate change due to
their geographies and economies.19
Industrialized countries are expected to finance adaption in poorer
countries, as industrialized countries have historically dominated
cumulative emissions.20 Climate adaptation, however, can be difficult to
distinguish from traditional development projects.21 Industrialized countries
can simply reclassify traditional development aid, and developing countries
can simply reclassify traditional development projects as climate adaptation
financing.22 Adaptation financing appears to be inadequate, although it is
increasing.23
Climate engineering is presently emerging as a third potential set of
responses to climate change.24 There are numerous proposed climate
engineering methods which vary widely in their means, goals, speeds, costs,
risks, capacities, and potential effectiveness.25 They are divided into two
distinct categories. The first is carbon dioxide removal (CDR), increasingly
called “negative emissions technologies,” in which intentional, large-scale
19.
See id. at § SPM (citing particular vulnerabilities in developing countries to
flooding, economic losses from disasters, negative human health effects, displacement, and
increased poverty).
20.
See, e.g., United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 1, para.
1, opened for signature May 9, 1992, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter UNFCCC] (discussing the responsibilities of developed countries under the
UNFCCC).
21.
See IPCC, IMPACTS, supra note 16, § 14.5 (“[Experts] have found it difficult to
clearly define and identify precisely what constitutes adaptation, how to track its
implementation and effectiveness, and how to distinguish it from effective development.”).
22.
See, e.g., BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FINANCE, HAVE DEVELOPED NATIONS BROKEN
THEIR PROMISE ON $30BN ‘FAST-START’ FINANCE? (Victoria Cuming ed., 2011), available at
http://about.bnef.com/white-papers/have-developed-nations-broken-their-promise-on-30bnfast-start-finance/ (observing that “only a small proportion of the promised funds [from
developed countries] are ‘new and additional,’ with the rest diverted from other aid
budgets”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT).
23.
See IPCC, IMPACTS, supra note 16, § 17 (“Global adaptation cost estimates are
substantially greater than current adaptation funding and investment, particularly in
developing countries, suggesting a funding gap and a growing adaptation deficit.”).
24.
See Christopher W. Belter & Dian J. Seidel, A Bibliometric Analysis of Climate
Engineering Research, 4 WILEY INTERDISC. REV. CLIMATE CHANGE 417, 417 (2013) (“The
past five years have seen a dramatic increase in the number of media and scientific
publications on the topic of climate engineering, or geoengineering, and some scientists are
increasingly calling for more research on climate engineering as a possible supplement to
climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies.”).
25.
See generally JOHN SHEPHERD ET AL., THE ROYAL SOCIETY, GEOENGINEERING THE
CLIMATE: SCIENCE, GOVERNANCE AND UNCERTAINTY (2009) (summarizing approaches to
climate engineering); GEOENGINEERING RESPONSES TO CLIMATE CHANGE: SELECTED ENTRIES
FROM THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SUSTAINABILITY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (Tim Lenton &
Naomi Vaughan eds., 2013) (discussing various climate engineering methods).
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interventions in earth systems would sequester the most important
greenhouse gases.26 Speaking generally and relatively, while these less
controversial and risky technologies would address climate change close to
its cause, they would be slow and expensive.27 Indeed, most risks of CDR
are local and of a character consistent with typical industrial activities,
although the environmental impacts could be quite significant if CDR is
scaled-up.28 A significant exception to these general CDR characteristics is
ocean fertilization.29 This process would accelerate the natural biological
carbon “pump,” in which marine phytoplankton indirectly incorporate
atmospheric carbon dioxide into their bodies as they grow.30 The
phytoplankton then sequester that carbon in the deeper ocean as they die
and sink.31 Some scientists believe that adding a locally limiting nutrient
(usually iron) to an area of the ocean would stimulate the growth of
phytoplankton and lead to significant carbon sequestration.32 This method,
however, poses risks to marine ecosystems.33 To date, over a dozen ocean
fertilization field trials have produced mixed results.34

26.
See IPCC, PHYSICAL SCIENCE, supra note 1, Annex III (defining CDR as “a set of
techniques that aim to remove CO2 directly from the atmosphere by either (1) increasing
natural sinks for carbon or (2) using chemical engineering to remove the CO2, with the intent
of reducing the atmospheric CO2 concentration”(emphasis original)).
27.
See THE ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 25, at 21 (noting that CDR methods are
technically possible and would have environmental impacts commensurate with their scale,
carry high costs, and operate slowly).
28.
See IPCC, PHYSICAL SCIENCE, supra note 1, § 6.5.1 (describing “direct air capture
of CO2 using industrial methods”); id. (“[I]t is likely that CDR would have to be deployed at
large-scale for at least one century to be able to significantly reduce atmospheric CO2.”).
29.
See id. § 6.5.2.2 (noting that ocean fertilization seeks to increase the rate of
transfer in the carbon cycle).
30.
See THE ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 25, at 16 (“Carbon dioxide is fixed from
surface waters by photosynthesisers—mostly, microscopic plants (algae). Some of the
carbon they take up sinks below the surface waters in the form of organic matter . . . .”).
31.
See id. at 17 (“The combined effect of photosynthesis in the surface followed by
respiration deeper in the water column is to remove CO2 from the surface and re-release it at
depth. This ‘biological pump’ exerts an important control on the CO2 concentration of
surface water, which in turn strongly inﬂuences the concentration in the atmosphere.”).
32.
See id. (“Methods [of fertilization] have been proposed to add otherwise limiting
nutrients to the surface waters, and so promote algal growth, and enhance the biological
pump.”).
33.
See Phillip Williamson et al., Ocean Fertilization for Geoengineering: A Review of
Effectiveness, Environmental Impacts and Emerging Governance, 90 PROCESS SAFETY AND
ENVTL. PROT. 475, § 5 (2012) (“A range of unintended and mostly undesireable impacts of
large-scale fertilization . . . include production of climate-relevant gases . . . ; effects on
productivity; . . . and effects on seafloor ecosystem[s].”).
34.
See SECRETARIAT OF THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, CONVENTION ON
BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, TECHNICAL SERIES NO. 45: SCIENTIFIC SYNTHESIS OF THE IMPACTS OF
OCEAN FERTILIZATION ON MARINE BIODIVERSITY 52 tbl.1 (2009) (summarizing field trials).
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The other category of climate engineering is solar radiation
management (SRM), which attempts to increase the portion of the incoming
sunlight that is reflected, counterbalancing the warming component of
climate change.35 In general, and relative to CDR, SRM would be fast and
inexpensive, but would address only a symptom of climate change, create
substantial risks, and is controversial.36 Three proposed methods stand out
as potentially effective, but are potentially risky. First, under stratospheric
aerosol injection (SAI), small particles would be introduced into the upper
atmosphere, mimicking the cooling effect that is observed after large
volcanic eruptions or—at lower atmospheric altitudes—in cities with air
pollution.37 Under the second method, marine cloud brightening (MCB),
ocean water would be sprayed into the air.38 The salt dust, which would
remain after the droplets evaporate, would act as cloud condensation nuclei,
in turn causing clouds to be more reflective.39 The third method would
place objects, such as mirrors or dust, in space.40 These proposed SRM
methods pose uncertain risks to the environment and humans. For example,
SRM would unequally counteract the temperature and precipitation
perturbations due to climate change.41 The result could be reduced
precipitation in some areas.42 Furthermore, sunlight reaching the ground
would be more diffuse while carbon dioxide concentrations remain
elevated, increasing plant primary productivity and altering ecosystems.43
The leading candidate for stratospheric injection, sulfur dioxide, may
35.
See IPCC, PHYSICAL SCIENCE, supra note 1, Annex III (defining SRM as “the
intentional modification of the Earth’s shortwave radiative budget with the aim to reduce
climate change according to a given metric” (emphasis original)).
36.
See id. § 7.7 (discussing the consequences of SRM techniques).
37.
See THE ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 25, at 29 (“Simulating the effect of large
volcanic eruptions on global climate has been the subject of proposals for climate
geoengineering for some time . . . . These proposals aim to artificially increase suphate
aerosols in the stratosphere . . . thereby reducing the incoming solar radiation.”).
38.
See id. at 27 (describing the process by which the salt from ocean water would be
used to increase the number of cloud-condensation nuclei.).
39.
See id. (“It is readily demonstrated that many small cloud micro droplets scatter
and so reflect more of the incident light than a smaller quantity of larger droplets of the same
total mass since the surface area of the small droplets is greater.”).
40.
See id. at 32 (“Space-based methods propose to reduce the amount of solar energy
reaching Earth by positioning sun-shields in space to reflect or deflect the solar radiation.”).
41.
See Simone Tilmes et al., The Hydrological Impact of Geoengineering in the
Geoengineering Model Intercomparison Project (GeoMIP), 118 J. GEOPHYSICAL RESEARCH:
ATMOSPHERES 11036, 11053 (2013) (describing the uneven effects of SRM on temperature
and precipitation).
42.
See id. (“[T]he hydrological cycle would be perceptibly weakened by SRM . . . .”).
43.
See J. Pongratz et al., Crop Yields in a Geoengineered Climate, 2 NATURE
CLIMATIC CHANGE 101, 101 (2012) (“We find that in our models solar-radiation
geoengineering in a high-CO2 climate generally causes crop yeields to increase, largely
because temperature stresses are deiminshed . . . .”).
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damage the ozone layer.44 Finally, if large-scale SRM were to stop
suddenly, then climate change—most of which would have been suppressed
by SRM—would accelerate, potentially causing more damage than if it had
occurred over decades.45 SRM techniques, however, are attractive due to
their ability to strongly and rapidly affect a large area at little cost.46
Because of SRM’s attractiveness, risks, and potential low barriers to entry,
world leaders would need to address decision-making, unilateralism,
control, and conflict.47
There are some risks that would be prevalent in both climate
engineering categories. For example, many commentators express concern
that discussion of or research into climate engineering would reduce
incentives and political willpower toward the preferred paths of emissions
reductions and adaptation.48 Others cite the potential development of vested
interests and technological momentum, which could influence future
policy.49
Although most of the public and academic climate engineering
discourse has focused on possible deployment, field research is more
urgent.50 Logically—and hopefully—testing will occur before any
deployment. Indeed, climate engineering research budgets are increasing
and some projects now include field work.51 Early SRM field experiments
44.
See P. Heckendorn et al., The Impact of Geoengineering Aerosols on Stratospheric
Temperature and Ozone, 4 ENVTL. RESEARCH LETTERS 1, 11 (2009) (linking proposed sulfur
stratospheric aerosol injection with likely ozone depletion).
45.
See IPCC, PHYSICAL SCIENCE, supra note 1, at 7-5 (“Additionally, scaling SRM to
substantial levels would carry the risk that if the SRM were terminated for any reason, there
is high confidence that surface temperatures would increase rapidly . . . which would stress
systems sensitive to the rate of climate change.”).
46.
See THE ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 25, at 34 (“It is likely that once a SRM
method is implemented the climate system woud respond quite quickly with surface
temperatures . . . .”).
47.
See, e.g., David G. Victor, On the Regulation of Geoengineering, 24 OXFORD REV.
ECON. POL’Y 322, 333 (2008) (“Growing attention to geoengineering will create pressure for
regulation.”).
48.
See Albert Lin, Does Geoengineering Present a Moral Hazard?, 40 ECOLOGY L.Q.
673, 674 (2013) (“Among the leading reasons for the geoengineering taboo was the worry
that geoengineering endeavors would undermine mainstream efforts to combat climate
change.”).
49.
See, e.g., Dale Jamieson, Ethics and Intentional Climate Change, 33 CLIMATIC
CHANGE 323, 333 (1996) (“[R]esearching a technology risks inappropriately developing
it . . . . A research program often creates a community of researchers that functions as an
interest group promoting the development of the technology that they are investigating.”).
50.
See Jesse Reynolds, The Regulation of Climate Engineering, 3 L. INNOVATION &
TECH. 113, 126 (2011) (arguing that climate change field research should generally be
considered distinct from deployment and that regulation of the former is more urgent).
51.
See, e.g., Research to Evaluate Climate Engineering: Risks, Challenges, and
Opportunities?, DEUTSCHE FORSCHUNGSGEMEINSCHAFT (May 27, 2013, 16:39),
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are examining natural, analogous phenomena and are also testing
equipment.52 At some point in the progression of this research, scientists
will desire to study the effectiveness and side effects of various SRM
methods.53 It may be advantageous for scientists to begin SRM field tests
relatively soon, because field tests with longer durations would require less
forceful climatic interventions in order to detect a significant signal among
the noise of weather.54 If the experiments are significant enough to alter the
climate, then there is the potential for them to pose some associated risk.55
Not all climate engineering field research, however, will pose
environmental risks.56 This paper specifically addresses field tests of the
riskier methods, such as ocean fertilization, SAI, and MCB, which are
designed to sequester a significant amount of carbon or to alter a regional
climate significantly.
III. Legal Aspects
Before moving into this paper’s core, which examines existing
international environmental law, several germane legal matters must be
http://www.spp-climate-engineering.de/news-single/items/287.html (announcing a new
program from the German Science Foundation that aims “to reduce the large uncertainties in
our current understanding of the impact of [climate engineering] on the planet”) (on file with
the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT); Daniel
Cressey, Cancelled Project Spurs Debate over Geoengineering Patents, 485 NATURE 429
(2012) (describing a planned field test of stratospheric injection equipment).
52.
See, e.g., Yu. A. Izrael et al., Field Studies of a Geo-engineering Method of
Maintaining a Modern Climate with Aerosol Particles, 34 RUSSIAN METEOROLOGY &
HYDROLOGY 635 (2009) (reporting the results of field experiments “studying the solar
radiation transmission in the visible wavelength range with model aerosol media formed in
the middle troposphere with the help of high-efficient standard aerosol generators aboard the
helicopter”); Henry Fountain, Trial Balloon: A Tiny Geoengineering Experiment GREEN:
ENERGY, THE ENV’T AND THE BOTTOM LINE (Jul. 17, 2012, 2:17 PM),
http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/17/trial-balloon-a-tiny-geoengineering-experiment/
(reporting on plans for a possible field trial in the United States) (on file with the
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
53.
See David Keith et al., Research on Global Sun Block Needed Now, 463 NATURE
426, 427 (2010) (arguing for field studies of SRM climate engineering).
54.
See Douglas G. MacMynowski et al., Can We Test Geoengineering?, 4 ENERGY
ENVTL. SCI. 5044, 5044 (2011) (quantifying “the trade-offs between duration and intensity of
the test and it’s [sic] ability to make quantitative measurements of the climate’s response to
SRM forcing”).
55.
See Alan Robock et al., Studying Geoengineering with Natural and Anthropogenic
Analogs, 121 CLIMATIC CHANGE 445, 446 (2013) (noting that “even small-scale experiments
outside a laboratory environment could carry some risk”).
56.
See Edward A. Parson & David W. Keith, End the Deadlock on Governance of
Geoengineering Research, 339 SCIENCE 1278, 1279 (“[M]uch promising process research
has trivial environmental impact, smaller than common commercial activities . . . .”).
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briefly addressed. First, when a powerful new technology—particularly if it
poses risks to humans and the environment—is proposed or introduced, it is
important to determine the ways in which existing law prohibits, permits, or
encourages its use.57 There are no MEAs and almost no international law,
broadly defined, that directly address climate engineering.58 Several MEAs
and aspects of customary international law, however, are important both in
a narrow sense of their specific application, and more generally—and
probably more importantly—when discussing the legal environment into
which any climate engineering research or techniques would be
introduced.59 Using a framework for regulation put forth by Roger
Brownsword,60 I conclude that generally, extant law channels positively, in
that it encourages climate engineering research, and that it has a positive
regulatory tilt, in that gaps or ambiguities in the law will more often be
resolved as permissive.61 It is in this sense that I assert that international
environmental law is favorable to climate engineering research.
The second matter is that, throughout these discussions, there is
often tension between the potential for climate engineering research to
reduce climate risks to humans and the environment, and its own potential
to cause harm.62 For shorthand, I refer to this as the “climate change/climate
engineering tension.” Although balancing such potential benefits and risks
is generally not a means of interpreting international law, in the case of
climate engineering, it is the logical way to proceed.63 I argue below that
existing international environmental law is best interpreted as being

57.
See Roger Brownsword & Han Somsen, Law, Innovation and Technology: Before
We Fast Forward, A Forum for Debate, 1 L. INNOVATION & TECH. 1 (2009) (describing the
importance of the regulatory environment for a new technology).
58.
See Karen N. Scott, International Law in the Anthropocene: Responding to the
Geoengineering Challenge, 34 MICH. J. INT’L L. 309, 330 (2013) (“With the exception of
reforestation and afforestation and ocean fertilization for scientific research purposes there
are few legal instruments explicitly applicable to geoengineering.”).
59.
See infra Parts IV–VI (discussing binding and nonbinding MEAs, as well as
customary international law).
60.
ROGER BROWNSWORD, RIGHTS, REGULATION, AND THE TECHNOLOGICAL
REVOLUTION (2008).
61.
See id. at 19–21 (presenting an analytical framework to examine regulations and
describe their relationship with policy goals, wherein a regulatory “tilt” is a default position
of regulators that can be interpreted despite ambiguities in existing regulation).
62.
See Scott, supra note 58, at 313 (“[G]eoengineering creates a clear risk of serious
harm to the transboundary and global environment; it utilizes common spaces such as the
high seas, atmosphere, or outer space; and it has yet to be addressed . . . in any regulatory
forum.”).
63.
See id. at 330 (explaining the need to analyze international environmental law as it
pertains to climate engineering using aggregate principles developed from various sources of
law).
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favorable toward climate engineering research.64 Even in the case of
deployment, scientists’ current understanding is that the expected negative
side effects of climate engineering would be much less severe than climate
change alone.65 Given this understanding, carefully conducted field
research—although it may present risks of its own to humans and the
environment—would help us understand the extent to which climate
engineering may be a beneficial option.66 Field research may be particularly
valuable if climate change is more severe than expected, if damages from
climate change are greater than expected, if we are unable to adapt society
and the environment, or if future emissions reductions are significantly
suboptimal.67 Furthermore, recall that “almost all justifications for
international environmental protection are predominantly and in some sense
anthropocentric.”68 The norms, rights, and obligations of international
environmental law reveal that, for the most part, States are committed to the
protection of humans and the environments that we value.69 Unsurprisingly,
economic considerations are dominant, and even non-economic
considerations, such as cultural and aesthetic benefits, are valued through a
human perspective.70
64.
See infra Parts IV–VI (arguing that climate engineering research is permissible
under current international environmental law).
65.
See IPCC, PHYSICAL SCIENCE, supra note 1, at 7-5 (“Models consistently suggest
that SRM would generally reduce climate differences compared to a world with elevated
greenhouse gas concentrations and no SRM . . . .”); see also Juan B. Moreno-Cruz et al., A
Simple Model to Account for Regional Inequalities in the Effectiveness of Solar Radiation
Management, 110 CLIMATIC CHANGE 649, 649 (2012) (“We find that an SRM scheme
optimized to restore population-weighted temperature changes to their baseline compensates
for 99% of these changes while an SRM scheme . . . compensates for 97% of these changes.
Hence, while inequalities in the effectiveness of SRM are important, they may not be as
severe as . . . assumed.”).
66.
See BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER’S TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE REMEDIATION,
GEOENGINEERING: A NATIONAL STRATEGIC PLAN FOR RESEARCH ON THE POTENTIAL
EFFECTIVENESS, FEASIBILITY, AND CONSEQUENCES OF CLIMATE REMEDIATION TECHNOLOGIES
3 (2011) (advocating for climate engineering research “to be able to judge whether particular
climate remediation techniques could offer a meaningful response to the risks of climate
change”).
67.
See generally Juan B. Moreno-Cruz & David W. Keith, Climate Policy Under
Uncertainty: A Case for Solar Geoengineering, 121 CLIMATIC CHANGE 431 (2012)
(modeling the benefits of climate engineering research based on the uncertain amount of
climate change for a given increase in greenhouse gas concentrations).
68.
PATRICIA W. BIRNIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 7 (2009).
69.
See id. at 7–8 (discussing the anthropocentric orientation of international
environmental law).
70.
See Scott, supra note 58, at 357 (“The integration of human and nature that
characterizes the Anthropocene has implicitly been recognized by the application of the core
principles of international environmental law to all activities likely to have a significant
impact on the environment . . . .”).
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This climate change/climate engineering tension is particularly
relevant because greenhouse gases and climate change often meet the
definitions of “pollution” or “adverse effects,” which the MEAs examined
below seek to reduce.71 Whether greenhouse gases, which harm humans
and the environment only indirectly, should be considered to be pollution is
not immediately obvious, and has been examined surprisingly little. Several
authors have concluded that greenhouse gases do indeed meet the criteria
for “pollution of the marine environment”72 under the UN Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),73 and nearly identical definitions are used
in the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP
Convention)74 and the Convention for the Protection of the Marine
Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR).75 Furthermore, there is
an emerging discourse as to whether States may be responsible and
potentially liable for greenhouse gas emissions.76 At the domestic level,
71.
See UNFCCC, supra note 20, art. 1, para. 1 (“‘Adverse effects of climate change’
means changes in the physical environment or biota resulting from climate change which
have significant deleterious effects on the composition, resilience or productivity of natural
and managed ecosystems or on the operation of socio-economic systems or on human health
and welfare.”).
72.
See, e.g., Richard S. J. Tol & Roda Verheyen, State Responsibility and
Compensation for Climate Change Damages—A Legal and Economic Assessment, 32
ENERGY POL’Y 1109, 1117 (2004) (concluding that greenhouse gases meet the UNCLOS
definition of pollution of the marine environment); Meinhard Doelle, Climate Change and
the Use of the Dispute Settlement Regime of the Law of the Sea Convention, 37 OCEAN DEV.
INT’L L. 319, 322 (2006) (“[I]t would seem that human-induced GHG emissions fit within
the definition of marine pollution in UNCLOS . . . .”).
73.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 1.1.4, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter UNCLOS] (“[P]ollution of the marine environment means the
introduction by man . . . of substances or energy into the marine environment . . . which
results or is likely to result in such deleterious effects as harm to living resources and marine
life, hazards to human health, hindrance to marine activities . . . .”).
74.
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution art. 1, Nov. 13, 1979,
1302 U.N.T.S. 219 [hereinafter LRTAP Convention] (“Air pollution means the
introduction . . . of substances or energy into the air resulting in deleterious effects of such a
nature as to endanger human health, harm living resources and ecosystems . . . and impair or
interfere with amenities and other legitimate uses of the environment . . . .”); see also
PHILIPPE SANDS & JACQUELINE PEEL, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
247 (3d ed. 2012) (“The deﬁnition of ‘air pollution’ is broad enough to include atmospheric
emissions of greenhouse gases and ozone-depleting substances as ‘air pollutants’ . . . . ”).
75.
Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East
Atlantic, art. 1(d), Sept. 22, 1992, 2354 U.N.T.S. 67 [hereinafter OSPAR Convention]
(“‘Pollution’ means the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substatnces or energy
into the maritime area which results, or is likely to result, in hazards to human health, harm
to living resources and marine ecosystems, damage to amenities or interference with other
legitimate uses of the sea.”).
76.
See CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY 9 (Michael Faure & Marjan Peeters eds., 2011)
(addressing “the question to what extent actions taken, mostly by public authorities, based
on the precautionary principle could specifically lead to liability”); see generally CLIMATE
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whether greenhouse gases are “air pollutants” under the Clean Air Act
(CAA) was central to a U.S. Supreme Court case, which ruled that the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has the authority to regulate
greenhouse gases.77 Vague terms in various MEAs may also raise the
climate change/climate engineering tension. Specifically, climate change
may satisfy the mostly undefined terms such as “damage” or “adverse
effects” found in the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone
Layer,78 the Antarctic Treaty System’s Madrid Protocol,79 and the
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).80 Similarly, commitments to
protect the environment often imply that States should consider innovative
actions such as climate engineering in order to do so.81
The third matter is that the legal implications for research are
different from those of deployment. Scientific research is encouraged by

CHANGE LIABILITY: TRANSNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE (Richard Lord et al. eds., 2011)
(discussing liability for state action or inaction as it pertains to addressing the effects of
climate change).
77.
See Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 534 (2007) (concluding
that under the Clean Air Act, the EPA has the power to regulate carbon emissions from
motor vehicles as air pollutant agents that contribute to climate change).
78.
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, art. 1.2, opened for
signature Mar. 22, 1985, 1513 U.N.T.S. 293 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (“‘Adverse
effects’ means changes in the physical environment or biota, including changes in climate,
which have significant deleterious effects on human health or on the composition, resilience
and productivity of natural land managed ecosystems, or on materials useful to mankind.”).
79.
Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, art. 3.2, Oct. 4,
1991, 30 I.L.M. 1461 [hereinafter Madrid Protocol] (prohibiting “activities that result in
adverse effects on climate or weather patterns, significant adverse effects on air or water
quality, significant changes in the atmospheric, terrestrial (including aquatic), glacial or
marine environments, and further jeopardy to endangered or threatened species or
populations of such species”).
80.
Convention on Biological Diversity, arts. 7(c), 8, opened for signature June 5,
1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79 [hereinafter CBD] (“Each contracting party shall identify processes
and categories of activities which have or are likely to have significant adverse impacts on
the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, and monitor their effects
through sampling and other techniques.”).
81.
See Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of
Environmental Modification Techniques, art. III.2, Dec. 10, 1976, 1108 U.N.T.S. 151
[hereinafter ENMOD] (“The State parties to this Convention undertake to facilitate, and
have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of scientific and technological
information on the use of environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes.”);
see also Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, para. 7,
June 16, 1972, 11 I.L.M. 1416 [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration] (“Man has the
fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of
a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being, and he bears a solemn responsibility to
protect and improve the environment for present and future generations.”).
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numerous multilateral agreements, environmental and non-environmental.82
These regulations are dominated by guidelines and other forms of soft law,
frequently developed by expert, non-state bodies.83 Some scholars assert
that there is a right to conduct research, although even this would be limited
by risks to others and the environment.84 Some treaties, such as those
concerning potential weapons of mass destruction, do not directly address
research but implicate it in their implementation.85 Research is referenced
only in passing in other agreements, such as the International Convention
for the Regulation of Whaling,86 but has become a central issue in the
implementation of these treaties.87 Among the MEAs examined here, only
UNCLOS and the Madrid Protocol contain detailed provisions governing
scientific research.88
In the case of climate engineering, the differences between research
and its deployment are due to the smaller scale of research, the lower state
of knowledge present during research, the generation of knowledge, and

82.
See infra text accompanying notes 125–126 (UNFCCC), 170, 176 (Vienna
Convention), 146–147 (ENMOD), 183 (LRTAP Convention), 198 (Oslo Protocol), 210
(Outer Space Treaty), 241–244 (UNCLOS), 293,–300 (Antarctica Treaty), 318 (OSPAR
Convention), 367 (Stockholm Declaration), 374 (Rio Declaration).
83.
See, e.g., Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects,
WORLD MED. ASS’N, http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/b3/ (last visited Mar.
22, 2014) (providing ethical guidelines for medical practitioners and researchers when using
human subjects in research and testing) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF
ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
84.
See Arjun Appadurai, The Right to Research, 4 GLOBAL SOC. EDUC. 167, 168
(2006) (arguing that there is a universal and fundamental right for all humans to research and
gather knowledge); see also Mark Brown & David Guston, Science, Democracy, and the
Right to Research, 15 SCI. ENG. ETHICS 351, 359 (2009) (“Non-scientists are also more
likely to accept the notion of a right to do research if it is explicitly coupled with an
acknowledgement that the preservation of this right depends on scientists fulﬁlling its
corresponding obligations.”).
85.
See, e.g., Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction,
Apr. 10, 1972, 26, U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163 (outlining the policies and procedures
necessary for any country wishing to develop, produce, or stockpile weapons of mass
destruction).
86.
See International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, art. VIII, Dec. 2,
1946, 161 U.N.T.S. 72 (“[A]ny contracting government may grant to any of its nationals a
special permit authorizing that national to kill, take and treat whales for purposes of
scientific research subject to such restrictions as to number and subject to such other
conditions as the Contracting Government thinks fit.”).
87.
See, e.g., id. (regulating whaling).
88.
See UNCLOS, supra note 73, art. 87, ¶¶ 238–65 (establishing the freedom to
conduct scientific research in the high seas so long as the interests of other States are
considered before research begins); Antarctic Treaty, pmbl, art. I-III, IX, Dec. 1, 1959, 204
U.N.T.S. 71 (establishing the use of Antarctica for, inter alia, scientific purposes).
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(possibly) the intent.89 Regarding scale, field tests will generally be
designed to impact a smaller region at a lesser intensity for a shorter
duration than full deployment, and any resulting damage to humans or the
environment should likewise be lesser, perhaps not meeting the threshold
for the applicable law.90 With respect to the state of knowledge during
research, the risks posed by field tests may remain uncertain at the time
they are carried out.91 The then-current state of knowledge will
consequently be germane to whether a given test would be considered
likely to harm humans or the environment. Furthermore, the tests are
intended to generate knowledge through scientific research, which is
encouraged by some of the MEAs discussed below. Finally, although the
intent of scientists could potentially help distinguish between field research
and deployment, it will be of little significance because international
environmental law is rarely concerned with intent.92
As an extension of the research-deployment distinction, the
category of “risky climate engineering field research” will not always be
discrete in two dimensions of comparison. “Vertically” it may be difficult
to distinguish those tests that pose no real risk from those which do, as well
as distinguishing large-scale field research from actual deployment.93

89.
See generally David R. Morrow et al., Toward Ethical Norms and Institutions for
Climate Engineering Research, 4 ENVTL. RESEARCH LETTERS 045106 (2009) (distinguishing
climate engineering research from climate engineering deployment based on environmental
impacts, timeline, and “the intentions of those carring out the [climate engineering] activity”
).
90.
See Parson & Keith, supra note 56, at 1279 (discussing the limited scale of
research).
91.
See MacMynowski et al., supra note 54, at 5044 (estimating the intensity of SRM
required in a large-scale field test and the possible resulting changes in precipitation).
92.
See Morrow, et. al., supra note 89, at 045106 (“Thus, the difference between CE
research and CE practice lies in the intentions of those carrying out the CE activity.”). At
least in the case of CDR, there may be a distinction between research and deployment based
on whether there is an intent to gain financial benefit. Indeed, the nascent international
regulatory framework for ocean fertilization requires that “legitimate scientific research”
have no direct financial benefits for the researcher. See infra Part IV.H (describing the LCLP’s prohibition against ocean dumping and its exception for “legitimate scientific
research”). Similarly, a recent field experiment explicitly examined marine cloud formation
and climate in general, but had clear implications for MCB SRM. See generally Lynn M.
Russell et al., Eastern Pacific Emitted Aerosol Cloud Experiment, 94 BULL. AM.
METEOROLOGICAL SOC’Y 709 (2013) (describing aerosol effects on warm-cloud
microphysics).
93.
See Alan Robock et al., A Test for Geoengineering?, 327 SCIENCE 530, 530 (2012)
(“We argue that geoengineering cannot be tested without full-scale implementation.”); but
see MacMynowski et al, supra note 54, at 5045 (“[O]ur results demonstrate that useful
knowledge can be obtained without full-scale implementation.”).
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“Laterally,” it may be difficult to distinguish outdoor research from similar
topics that resemble—but are not—climate engineering.94
The fourth legal matter is the function of law. Regulation in general
can be called “the sustained and focused attempt to alter the behavior of
others according to defined standards or purposes with the intention of
producing a broadly defined outcome or outcomes.”95 Thus, regulation can
both encourage and discourage certain actions.96 Indeed, law has
enablement and facilitation among its functions, and has obligations,
incentives, and exhortations among its tools.97 Yet, regulation is too often
framed as being only restrictive.98
Fifth, it is with respect to these previous three aspects—the climate
change/climate engineering tension, the differences between research and
deployment, and the enabling function of law—that the existing legal
literature concerning climate engineering, although enlightening, remains
limited. A number of scholars have reviewed how international law may
restrict a State’s deployment of climate engineering.99 These scholars
94.
See Morrow, et. al., supra note 89, at 045106 (“[T]he technologies developed or
made possible through . . . research may be deployed in ways intended to cause harm. We
can foresee some of these ways, but not all.”). For example, a “rogue” researcher claimed
that his ocean fertilization was to increase the stock of salmon, which feed on phytoplankton.
This may have allowed him to comply with the letter, but not the spirit, of international law.
See Neil Craik et al., Regulating Geoengineering Research through Domestic Environmental
Protection Frameworks: Reflections on the Recent Canadian Ocean Fertilization Case,
CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 117, 117–18 (2013) (“The principals involved in the activity
characterized it as an ocean ‘restoration’ project . . . . However, they also made public
statements indicating that they planned to generate revenue.”).
95.
Julia Black, Decentering Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and
Self Regulation in a “Post-Regulatory” World, 54 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 103, 142
(2001).
96.
See ANTHONY OGUS, REGULATION: LEGAL FORM AND ECONOMIC THEORY 1 (1994)
(“[T]he state seeks to encourage or direct behaviour which it is assumed would not occur
without such intervention.”).
97.
See id. (addressing how regulation can cause parties to act in certain ways).
98.
See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1398 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “regulation” as
the “act or process of controlling by rule or restriction”).
99.
See, e.g., Daniel Bodansky, May We Engineer the Climate?, 33 CLIMATIC CHANGE
309, 310 (1996) (analyzing the legal restrictions on climate engineering); see also Ralph
Bodle, Geoengineering and International Law: The Search for Common Legal Ground, 46
TULSA L. REV. 305, 308 (2010) (reviewing sources of international law that effect the
permissibility of climate engineering); Rex J. Zedalis, Climate Change and the National
Academy of Sciences’ Idea of Geoengineering: One American Academic’s Perspective on
First Considering the Text of Existing International Agreements, 19 EUR. ENERGY ENVTL. L.
REV. 18, 20 (2010) (critiquing the nature of international agreements and the attitude toward
climate engineering); Catherine Redgwell, Geoengineering the Climate: Technological
Solutions to Mitigation-Failure or Continuing Carbon Addiction?, 5 CARBON & CLIMATE L.
REV. 178, 181–88 (2011) (describing the limitations imposed by the current legal regime);
Gerd Winter, Climate Engineering and International Law: Last Resort or the End of
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generally overlook the more urgent topic of field research, the fact that
international law enables field research, and that the purpose of climate
engineering would be to reduce climate change risks.100
Sixth, not all risks are alike. Specifically, those risks discussed
above can be conceptualized on a rough spectrum from environmental to
social in character. Changes to precipitation due to SRM and ecological
impacts from ocean fertilization are, for the most part, environmental
risks.101 Technological momentum and a “slippery slope” from research to
deployment are relatively social risks.102 International environmental law
could be an effective set of tools for reducing the former group.103 On the
other hand, the management of the more social risks will call for a broader
set of innovative legal and non-legal means in international, transnational,
and national settings, possibly including international environmental law
but likely relying more heavily on a plurality of diverse means.104
As a final note, it must be remembered that international law is not
implemented solely through literal readings of treaty texts. Instead, it is
self-enforced and enforced internationally through political channels among
countries of unequal power, reputation, and interests.105 An act by a
Humanity?, 20 REV. EUR. COMM. & INT’L ENVTL. L. 277, 279 (2011) (explaining the effects
of law on climate engineering activity); David A. Wirth, Engineering the Climate:
Geoengineering as a Challenge to International Governance, 40 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
413, 421–24 (2013) (describing the limits imposed by the current legal framework on
climate engineering proposals); Scott, supra note 58 (reviewing possible contradictions in
international law presented by climate engineering).
100.
See, e.g., Winter, supra note 99, at 288 (concluding normatively that “large-scale
research of SRM must be prohibited from the outset”).
101.
See Press Release, European Geosciences Union, Geoengineering Could Disrupt
Rainfall Patterns (June 6, 2012), available at http://www.egu.eu/news/4/geoengineeringcould-disrupt-rainfall-patterns/ (“Under the scenario studied, rainfall strongly decreases . . . .
Overall, global rainfall is reduced by about five percent on average in all four models
studied.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT).
102.
See SOLAR RADIATION MANAGEMENT GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE, SOLAR RADIATION
MANAGEMENT: THE GOVERNANCE OF RESEARCH 21 (2011), available at
http://www.srmgi.org/report/ (“Even very basic . . . research into SRM could be a first step
onto a ‘slippery slope’ towards deployment. Research could create momentum for
development of SRM technology, as well as . . . lobbying . . . [which] could use its influence
to override moral and other objections or to unduly influence public opinion.”) (on file with
the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
103.
See id. at 35 (describing international environmental instruments and institutions
as a method of governance).
104.
See, e.g., id. at 35–37 (listing additional forms of governance, including “a
collection of independent national policies” and “a non-governmental, transnational code of
conduct”).
105.
See Richard H. Steinberg, Wanted: Dead or Alive—Realist Approaches To
International Law, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART 146, 150 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A.
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responsible member of the international community, which technically is
contrary to an MEA but which other members view favorably, is unlikely to
be condemned.106 Likewise, a willful act by a so-called rogue state which
violates no international law, but may have negative impacts on other
countries, will be condemned.107 Although this article uses a rather literal
reading, this is intended as a starting point and will not necessarily perfectly
reflect reality.
IV. Binding Multilateral Environmental Agreements
Binding MEAs constitute the most important source of international
environmental law. This section reviews those MEAs that will likely have
the most impact on climate engineering field research. For the sake of
brevity and focus, this review is limited in three ways: to agreements
concerned with environmental protection (even though other domains such
as human rights may be relevant); to those agreements that are pertinent to
climate engineering research; and to global agreements or MEAs that cover
a large geographical areas. Although no MEAs directly address climate
engineering, their objectives, commitments, and hortatory statements both
reflect and influence state behavior, illuminating the norms of the
international community.108 This review will require an exercise in treaty
interpretation.109 Of course, MEAs are not merely isolated collections of
Pollack eds., 2013) (arguing that “international law reflects the interests of powerful states”
and that “if an international law contradicts the long-term interests of a powerful state, then
it will not comply with it”).
106.
See, e.g., INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL KOSOVO COMMISSION, THE KOSOVO
REPORT 186 (2000) (“The Commission concludes that the NATO military intervention was
illegal but legitimate.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY,
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
107.
See Anthony C. Arend, International Law and Rogue States: The Failure of the
Charter Framework, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 735, 735–36 (discussing the ramifications of a
rogue State’s actions that do not violate international law but are still disapproved of by the
international community); Daniel H. Joyner, Iran's Nuclear Program and International Law,
2 PENN. ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 237 (2013) (arguing that Iran’s nuclear program complies with
international law, despite condemnation by Western countries and the International Atomic
Energy Agency).
108.
See David G. Victor, Enforcing International Environmental Law: Implications
for an Effective Global Warming Regime, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 147, 151 (Fall
1999) (“More than 140 multilateral environmental agreements govern behavior related to
dozens of international environmental issues. . . . [D]espite the rarity of enforcement
mechanisms, generally countries have complied with their international environmental
commitments.”).
109.
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 31–33, opened for signature
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (providing that a treaty is to be interpreted in good faith,
within its legal context, and in a manner consistent with its objectives; that words are to be
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words. Although intergovernmental and national institutions that operate in
a complex political reality implement them, this paper emphasizes the
actual texts of these documents.
A. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is
the most important document in international environmental law regarding
climate engineering because of its subject matter, its global participation,
and its robust institutional support.110 Its objective is not merely to prevent
dangerous climate change, but to do so in a manner that is balanced with
other anthropocentric and environmental desiderata:
The ultimate objective . . . is . . . stabilization of greenhouse
gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the
climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a
time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally
to climate change, to ensure that food production is not
threatened and to enable economic development to proceed
in a sustainable manner.111
Likewise, the key phrase “adverse effects of climate change” encompasses
harm both to the environment and “the operation of socio-economic
systems or . . . human health and welfare.”112 Similarly, the UNFCCC’s
first principle indicates that a chief reason to minimize climate change is
anthropocentric: “The Parties should protect the climate system for the
benefit of present and future generations of humankind.”113 This MEA does
not limit states’ actions in meeting its objectives to its commitments,
implying that states may do so by other means.114

understood in their ordinary meaning; and that ambiguities may be clarified through
preparatory documents and “the circumstances of its conclusion”).
110.
See Lakshman Guruswamy, Energy Justice and Sustainable Development, 21
COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 231, 233–34 n.5 (2010) (discussing the wide acceptance of
the UNFCCC based on its ratification by 194 States).
111.
UNFCCC, supra note 20, art. 2.
112.
Id. art. 1.1.
113.
Id. art. 3.1.
114.
See id. art. 4.2(a) (“Each of these Parties shall adopt national policies and take
corresponding measures . . . . These Parties may implement such policies and measures
jointly with other Parties and may assist other Parties in contributing to the achievement of
the objective of the Convention . . . .”).
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At a minimum, the UNFCCC supports research into CDR,
including ocean fertilization. In its text, Parties commit to stabilize
greenhouse gases through both the reduction of emissions and the
enhancement of sinks and reservoirs, which is defined to include oceans
and the biological pump.115 Three separate commitments obligate Parties to
mitigate the adverse effects of climate change through such sinks and
reservoirs.116 Two of these commitments include the enhancement of sinks
and reservoirs, and one explicitly refers to oceans: “All
Parties . . . shall . . . promote and cooperate in the conservation and
enhancement, as appropriate, of sinks and reservoirs of all greenhouses
gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, including . . . oceans as well
as other . . . marine ecosystems.”117 These goals are furthered by the
agreement’s Kyoto Protocol, which, although focused on emission
reduction, commits Parties to further the Protocol’s objectives by
researching and promoting “carbon dioxide sequestration technologies
and . . . advanced and innovative environmentally sound technologies.”118
The UNFCCC is less clear with respect to the development of
SRM, which would not further the agreement’s objective of stabilizing
greenhouse gas concentrations.119 Two general conclusions of scientific
research must be highlighted before examining specific provisions. First,
humans will soon be, or perhaps already are, committed to a magnitude of
future climate change that is “dangerous” because it will threaten
115.
See id. arts. 1.7, 1.8, 4.1, 4.2. (defining a reservoir as “a component or components
of the climate system where a greenhouse gas or a precursor of a greenhouse gas is stored”
and a sink as “any process, activity or mechanism which removes a greenhouse gas, an
aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse gas from the atmosphere”).
116.
See id. arts. 4.1(b), 4.1(d), 4.2(a) (setting out the different obligations of parties to
mitigate adverse climate change).
117.
Id. arts. 4.1(d), 4.2(a).
118.
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148, art. 2.1(a)(iv); see also id. art. 10(c) (requiring Parties to
“[c]ooperate in the promotion of effective modalities for the development, application and
diffusion of, and take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate,
the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound technologies, know-how, practices and
processes pertinent to climate change, in particular to developing countries, including the
formulation of policies and programmes for the effective transfer of environmentally sound
technologies that are publicly owned or in the public domain and the creation of an enabling
environment for the private sector, to promote and enhance the transfer of, and access to,
environmentally sound technologies”).
119.
See UNFCCC, supra note 20, art. 2 (“The ultimate objective of this
Convention . . . is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention,
stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”); THE ROYAL
SOCIETY, supra note 25, at 24 (“While SRM methods might therefore help to mitigate
against a rise in global mean surface temperature, they do nothing directly to reduce
atmospheric concentrations of CO2, or the rate at which they are increasing.”).
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ecosystems, food production, and sustainable economic development.120
Second, current models indicate that potential SAI or MCB deployment
would be rapid and relatively inexpensive.121
Several passages in the UNFCCC indicate a relatively favorable
position regarding SRM research. As quoted above, the UNFCCC’s
objective calls for some urgency, given the expected onset of significant
climate change.122 Furthermore, another principle of the UNFCCC states
that “[t]he Parties should . . . tak[e] into account that policies and measures
to deal with climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global
benefits at the lowest possible cost.”123 Similarly, a more strongly-worded
commitment states that Parties “shall . . . employ appropriate
methods . . . with a view to minimizing adverse effects on the economy, on
public health and on the quality of the environment, of projects or measures
undertaken by them to mitigate or adapt to climate change.”124 From these
provisions, SRM could be understood to be a form of adaptation, albeit an
extreme one. Finally, multiple passages call for the development and
diffusion of technology and research, further implying a positive stance
toward climate engineering research.125 For example:
All Parties . . . shall . . . Promote and cooperate in
scientific, technological, technical, socio-economic and
other research . . . intended to further the understanding and
to reduce or eliminate the remaining uncertainties
regarding . . . the economic and social consequences of
various response strategies; [and] Promote and cooperate in
the full, open and prompt exchange of relevant scientific,
technological, [and] technical . . . information related
120.
See Morrow et al., supra note 89, at 045106 (“With regard to the moral hazard,
unless scientists take great care in what experiments they do, what they publish, and how
they explain their work, the public and policy makers may develop an optimistic bias . . . . If
this happens, hope for a technological fix for climate change may cripple efforts to limit
greenhouse gas emissions.”).
121.
See THE ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 25, at 24–33 (noting the low estimated costs
of several SRM techniques). Estimates for the financial cost of SRM to counterbalance the
warming effect of a doubling of atmospheric carbon dioxide range from approximately $1
billion to $100 billion per year. See generally Gernot Klepper & Wilfried Rickels, The Real
Economics of Climate Engineering, ECON. RESEARCH INT’L 316564 (2012) (discussing the
financial costs of climate engineering).
122.
See supra note 111 and accompanying text (stating the objectives of the
UNFCCC).
123.
UNFCCC, supra note 20, art. 3.3.
124.
Id. art. 4.1(f).
125.
See id. arts. 4.3, 4.7, 4.8, 4.9, and 11.1 (requiring Parties to develop and diffuse
new technologies and to engage in research).
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to . . . the economic and social consequences of various
response strategies.126
The UNFCCC invokes two applicable principles of international
environmental law, both of which point favorably to climate engineering
research. First, efforts to minimize climate change must be done according
to common but differentiated responsibilities.127 Climate engineering
research is consistent with this, as exclusively industrialized countries
presently fund it, which is likely to continue for the foreseeable future.128
Meanwhile all countries, especially the less developed ones, which are on
average more vulnerable to climate change, could benefit from the
increased knowledge of possible alternative responses to climate change.129
Second, the UNFCCC invokes the precautionary principle:
126.
Id. art. 4.1(g) and (h); see also arts. 5, 9.2 (stating that the phrase “response
strategies” is undefined but presumably could include responses other than those encouraged
by the UNFCCC).
127.
See id. pmbl. ¶ 6, art. 3.1, 4.1 (discussing action needed to minimize climate
change).
128.
See Andrew Parker & David Keith, Public Research Funds Committed To
Geoengineering
Research
Projects
(Oct.
31,
2012),
http://environment.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/srm_projects_around_the_world.pdf
(indicating that climate engineering research projects are publicly-funded in Austria,
Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Norway, and the United Kingdom) (on file with the
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
129.
See UNFCCC, supra note 20, pmbl. (recognizing that developing countries “are
particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change”). This assumes open
publications of results and minimal intellectual property claims, which appear to be
emerging norms, especially for SRM. See generally Michael MacCracken et al., THE
ASILOMAR CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATIONS ON PRINCIPLES FOR RESEARCH INTO CLIMATE
ENGINEERING
TECHNIQUES
(2010),
available
at
http://www.climate.org/PDF/AsilomarConferenceReport.pdf (calling for open and
cooperative climate engineering research) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL
OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT); BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER’S TASK FORCE
ON CLIMATE REMEDIATION, GEOENGINEERING: A NATIONAL STRATEGIC PLAN FOR RESEARCH
ON THE POTENTIAL EFFECTIVENESS, FEASIBILITY, AND CONSEQUENCES OF CLIMATE
REMEDIATION
TECHNOLOGIES
(2011),
available
at
http://bipartisanpolicy.org/library/report/task-force-climate-remediation-research
(advocating open and interdisciplinary research efforts) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND
LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT); Steve Rayner et al., The
Oxford Principles, 121 CLIMATIC CHANGE 499 (2013) (proposing norms for climate
engineering and its research, including open publication of results and minimal patents on
SRM technologies); see also Anne C. Mulkern, Researcher: Ban Patents on Geoengineering
(Apr.
18,
2012),
Technology,
CLIMATEWIRE
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=researcher-ban-patents-ongeoengineering-technology (quoting a prominent climate engineering researcher calling for
no patents on SRM technologies) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF
ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
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Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate,
prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and
mitigate its adverse effects. Where there are threats of serious
or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should
not be used as a reason for postponing such measures,
taking into account that policies and measures to deal with
climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global
benefits at the lowest possible cost . . . .130

The drafters of the UNFCCC likely intended that this principle refer to the
scientific uncertainty surrounding climate change and its causes. More than
twenty years later, however, there is much less uncertainty concerning
climate change, yet lingering uncertainty regarding potential responses.131
As an analogous example, the precautionary principle could encourage
hypothetical large multilateral investment in alternative energy research,
which is a possible yet scientifically uncertain response. Along similar
lines, this passage can also offer a precautionary case for climate
engineering research, in which CDR research would be a precautionary
measure toward minimizing the causes of climate change, and SRM
research would be one toward mitigating its adverse effects.132
The UNFCCC also addresses transboundary environmental harm.
In the preamble it notes States’ obligations to prevent environmental harm,
and the agreement later calls for the minimization of the adverse effects of
combating climate change.133 The UNFCCC thus invokes customary
international law coupled with a commitment to consider minimizing
adverse effects.134 States would thus need to undertake certain procedures,
130.
UNFCCC, supra note 20, art. 3.3 (emphasis added).
131.
See IPCC, PHYSICAL SCIENCE, supra note 1, § TS.2.1 (discussing advancements in
scientists’ understanding of the climate change and its causes); Alejandro E. Camacho,
Adapting Governance to Climate Change: Managing Uncertainty Through a Learning
Infrastructure, 59 EMORY L.J. 4, 10 (2009) (“Extensive evidence confirms that global
climate change is already occurring . . . . Yet the extent of these impending impacts and the
exact future distribution of impacts globally and domestically are far from clear.”).
132.
See generally Jesse L. Reynolds & Floor Fleurke, Climate Engineering Research:
A Precautionary Response to Climate Change?, 2 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 101 (2013)
(arguing that the exercise of precaution, particularly as it is embodied in the UNFCCC, calls
for climate engineering research).
133.
See UNFCCC, supra note 20, pmbl. (recalling states’ “responsibility to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other
States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction”); id. art. 4.1(f) (requiring States
to minimize adverse effects of projects or measures undertaken to mitigate or adapt to
climate change).
134.
See id. art. 3, para. 3 (“The Parties should take precautionary measures to
anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse
effects.”).
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including notification, consultation, and cooperation, as well as (arguably)
impact assessment and subsequent monitoring prior to large-scale climate
engineering field tests that may have transboundary impacts.135
One possible obstacle for climate engineering research is the
UNFCCC’s prioritization of emissions reductions and the enhancement of
sinks and reservoirs, processes, which are not affected by SRM.136
Although the UNFCCC does necessarily exclude other methods of climate
engineering, it could theoretically condemn climate engineering research if
it were to undermine the goal of emissions reductions by reducing the
political willpower for the reductions.137 This interpretation, however,
requires both the implausible evidence of the basis of decision-makers’
behavior and a radical treaty interpretation wherein a complementary action
would be prohibited if it lessened the magnitude of a committed action.138
Independent of the UNFCCC’s text, its related institutions are the
most likely sites for the top-down development of international norms and
rules governing climate engineering research.139 This is due to the close
relevance of the agreement’s subject matter, its universal participation, and
the bodies created by it, including the Conference of Parties (COP),
Secretariat, Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice,
and—subsequently formed by the COP—the Technology Executive
Committee.140
B. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of
Environmental Modification Techniques
The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile
Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD) is another
highly pertinent MEA, as it is the only binding treaty that directly addresses
intentional climatic interventions.141 Most industrialized countries are
135.
See id. art. 4, paras. 1(e), (g), (h), (i), (j) (summarizing procedural responsibilities
of the Parties).
136.
See UNFCCC, supra note 20, art. 4.1(b) and (d) (prioritizing the use of sinks and
reservoirs to reduce greenhouse gases in the atmosphere).
137.
See Winter, supra note 99, at 288 (arguing that “large-scale research of SRM must
be prohibited from the outset” because, inter alia, “interpretation the law prohibits measures
[i.e. climate engineering] that weaken the implementation of Plan A [i.e. emissions
reduction]”).
138.
See id. (arguing that customary international law prohibits such an interpretation of
the UNFCCC).
139.
See Bodansky, supra note 99, at 313 (“[I]t is likely that the institutions created by
the Convention would provide the principal international fora for consideration of climate
engineering proposals.”).
140.
See id. (discussing the relevant international bodies).
141.
See ENMOD, supra note 81, art. I.1, III.1 (describing the purpose of ENMOD).
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Parties to this Convention, but it is considered to be a dormant instrument,
with neither supporting institutions nor regular meetings.142 Even more so
than with the UNFCCC, a careful reading of the text reveals a favorable
legal setting for climate engineering research. Although the definition of
“environmental modification techniques” includes many forms of climate
engineering,143 ENMOD prohibits only “engag[ing] in military or any other
hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread,
long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury
to any other State Party.”144 ENMOD does not prohibit the research and
development of potentially hostile environmental modification techniques,
and it explicitly states that it “shall not hinder the use of environmental
modification techniques for peaceful purposes.”145 Moreover, ENMOD
recognizes and encourages peaceful environmental modification: “[Parties]
[r]ealiz[e] that the use of environmental modification techniques for
peaceful purposes could improve the interrelationship of man and nature
and contribute to the preservation and improvement of the environment for
the benefit of present and future generations . . . .”146 Parties are to
exchange scientific information regarding peaceful environmental
modification, and those with the financial means “shall contribute . . . to
international economic and scientific co-operation in the preservation,
improvement and peaceful utilization of the environment . . . .”147 If “the
preservation, improvement and peaceful utilization of the environment”
were to include reducing climate change risks, the passage could even be
interpreted as an obligation for industrialized Parties to “contribute” to
climate engineering research.
If a Party were to assert that another’s climate engineering field
research were hostile and damaging, a complaint under ENMOD would be
142.
See Arunabha Gosh & Jason Blackstock, Does Geoengineering Need a Global
Response—and of What Kind? International Aspects of SRM Research Governance
(SRMGI,
background
paper,
2011),
available
at
http://www.srmgi.org/files/2011/09/SRMGI-International-background-paper.pdf
(“[ENMOD] has had only two review conferences (1984 and 1992) which updated the
convention only with non-binding ‘understandings,’ the bulk of its ratifications came in the
1970s and 1980s . . . and attempts by the General Assembly to have it universally ratified
have come to naught.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY,
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
143.
See ENMOD, supra note 81, art. II (“[T]he term ‘environmental modification
techniques’ refers to any technique for changing—through the deliberate manipulation of
natural processes—the dynamics, composition or structure of the Earth, including its biota,
lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, or of outer space.”).
144.
Id. art. I.1.
145.
Id. art. III.1.
146.
Id. pmbl.
147.
Id. art. III.2.
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difficult to enforce.148 The damage would need to occur in the environment
of the complainant, as ENMOD applies neither to the environments of nonParties, to that of the country engaged in the activity, nor to that of nonstate areas.149 The document contains only weak enforcement
mechanisms.150 Complaints would be lodged with the UN Security Council,
where any of the five permanent members—who are among the States most
likely to conduct climate engineering field research—could veto Council
action.151 Finally, ENMOD is an inactive legal instrument, and no
complaints have ever been lodged under it. Nevertheless, if “awakened”
from its dormant state, it is possible that ENMOD could play a role in
facilitating climate engineering research.152 For example, Parties are to
consult and cooperate in resolving problems that may arise in the
implementation of the agreement.153 In addition, its Consultative
Committee of Experts could be convened and serve as a forum for the
exchange of relevant information and for the development of norms to
guide research.154
C. Convention on Biological Diversity
The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) is an MEA whose
significance to climate engineering research is not through its text or
specific commitments per se, but instead through its nearly universal
participation, its strong institutional support, and the fact that most large
scale human endeavors affect biodiversity.155 Its provisions are broad, and

148.
See Charles R. Wunsch, The Environmental Modification Treaty, 4 ASILS INT’L
L.J. 113, 128–29 (1980) (describing key shortcomings in the enforcement mechanism of
ENMOD).
149.
See id. at 128–29 (explaining the reach of ENMOD).
150.
See id. at 122 (describing the areas critics have frequently cited).
151.
See ENMOD, supra note 81, art. V (“Any State Party to this Convention which
has reason to believe that any other State Party is acting in breach of obligations deriving
from the provisions of the Convention may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of
the United Nations.”); Wunsch, supra note 148, at 129 (“The problem is the Security
Council’s action can be vetoed by one of its five permanent members.”).
152.
See Wunsch, supra note 154, at 131 (outlining the potential positive consequences
of ENMOD).
153.
See ENMOD, supra note 81, art. V.1 (“The State Parties to this Convention
undertake to consult one another and to co-operate in solving any problems which may arise
in relation to the objectives of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention.”).
154.
See id. art. III.2, V.2 (noting additional means of information dispersement, such
as the Consultative Committee of Experts).
155.
See CBD, supra note 80, art. 4 (describing the expansive jurisdictional scope of
the
treaty);
List
of
Parties,
CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY,
http://www.cbd.int/information/parties.shtml (last visited Mar. 23, 2014) (identifying the
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some may apply in the context of climate engineering and its research, such
as the call for Parties to identify and to control activities that have
“significant adverse impacts” on biodiversity.156 This presents the climate
change/engineering tension, in that both climate change and climate
engineering may impact biodiversity. For example, a CBD report concluded
that climate engineering “could reduce the magnitude of climate change and
its impacts on biodiversity. At the same time, most geoengineering
techniques are likely to have unintended impacts on biodiversity.”157
This connection would have remained somewhat tenuous, had the
CBD Conferences of Parties (COP) not addressed climate engineering. At
the 2008 COP, Parties urged States to ensure that ocean fertilization CDR
not take place until risks and benefits were better understood and
regulations were in place, with an exception for “small scale scientific
research studies within coastal waters.”158 Two years later, it agreed upon a
broader statement concerning all climate engineering, in which it
[I]nvites
Parties
and
other
Governments . . . to
consider . . . ensur[ing] . . . in the absence of science based,
global, transparent and effective control and regulatory
mechanisms for geo-engineering, and in accordance with
the precautionary approach and Article 14 of the
Convention, that no climate-related geo-engineering
activities that may affect biodiversity take place, until there
is an adequate scientific basis on which to justify such
activities and appropriate consideration of the associated
risks for the environment and biodiversity and associated
social, economic and cultural impacts, with the exception
of small scale scientific research studies that would be
conducted in a controlled setting in accordance with Article
3 of the Convention, and only if they are justified by the
Convention’s 193 parties) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY,
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
156.
See CBD, supra note 80, art. 7(c) (“Each Contracting Party shall . . . [i]dentify
processes and categories of activities which have or are likely to have significant adverse
impacts on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, and monitor their
effects through sampling and other techniques.”).
157.
SECRETARIAT OF THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, CONVENTION ON
BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, TECHNICAL SERIES NO. 66: GEOENGINEERING IN RELATION TO THE
CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY: TECHNICAL AND REGULATORY MATTERS 14 (Sept.
2012); see also id. at 8 (citing climate change as one of the “current main drivers of
biodiversity loss”).
158.
Ninth Meeting of the Conference of Parties to the Convention on Biological
Diversity, May 19–30, 2008, Decision IX/16—Biodiversity and Climate Change 7, U.N.
Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/IX/16/C.4 (2008).
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need to gather specific scientific data and are subject to a
thorough prior assessment of the potential impacts on the
environment.159
Although clearly a statement of caution, it is nonbinding for at least three
reasons. First, as described above, the CBD’s commitments consistently
utilize soft, qualified language. For example, the article invoked by the
COP climate engineering decision opens with the phrase “as far as possible
and as appropriate.”160 Second, the language of this COP decision uses even
weaker language, merely “invit[ing]” countries “to consider” action.161
Third, the COP does not have the authority to develop binding law.162
D. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer
The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and
its Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer are
germane to climate engineering because SAI SRM using sulfur dioxide,
presently the most widely considered injection substance, might damage
stratospheric ozone.163 Presumably, large scale field research into these
methods may also have similar effects, and the observation of such impacts
could be among the goals of research.164 The only existing provision
contained in these MEAs that may restrict sulfur-based SAI research is that
Parties to the Vienna Convention are to implement laws “to control, limit,
reduce or prevent human activities . . . [which] have or are likely to have
adverse effects resulting from modification or likely modification of the
ozone layer[,]” wherein “adverse effects” are environmental changes
“including changes in climate, which have significant deleterious effects on

159.
Tenth Meeting of the Conference of Parties to the Convention on Biological
Diversity, Oct. 18–29, 2010, Decision X/33—Biodiversity and Climate Change 5, U.N. Doc.
UNEP/CBD/COP/DECX/33/8(w) (2010).
160.
CBD, supra note 80, art. 14.
161.
Tenth Meeting of the Conference of Parties to the Convention on Biological
Diversity, supra note 159, at 5.
162.
See CBD, supra note 80, art 23 (describing the powers of the COP, which can
initiate binding protocols and amendments, however, they must be ratified by the Parties).
163.
See Vienna Convention, supra note 78, art. 2 (outlining the Convention’s
commitment to protect human health and the environment from the adverse effects of harm
to the ozone layer); R.L. McKenzie et al., Ozone Depletion and Climate Change: Impacts on
UV Radiation, 10 PHOTOCHEMICAL & PHOTOBIOLOGICAL SCIS. 182, 189 (2011) (“[T]his geoengineering strategy would increase Arctic ozone depletion during the 21st century and
delay Antarctic ozone recovery by 30 to 70 years.”).
164.
See THE ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 25, at 31 (arguing that this method’s impact
on ozone needs to be studied further).

446

5 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY CLIMATE & ENV’T 417 (2014)

human health” or the environment.165 This, however probably will not
restrict climate engineering field research, largely due to the climate
change/climate engineering tension: climate change itself is expected to
impact stratospheric ozone in uncertain ways.166 In contrast, the effect of
SAI SRM on stratospheric ozone remains uncertain and may be relatively
small.167 Furthermore, the aerosol particles would partially block incoming
ultraviolet radiation, the increase of which—due to ozone depletion—was
the original impetus behind the Vienna Convention.168 Thus, it is presently
unclear whether SAI SRM deployment would cause a net increase or
decrease in “adverse effects,” but field tests could help resolve this
question.169
Beyond this, the Vienna Convention, as a framework treaty, has
limited commitments, such as to cooperate in relevant scientific research.170
In contrast, the Montreal Protocol contains stronger provisions, using a
“black list” of specific prohibited ozone-depleting substances, which can be
(and has been) expanded.171 If the Parties to the Montreal Protocol were to
consider restricting sulfur dioxide SAI SRM research (or deployment), they
would need to take into account both its potential benefits and risks.
Moreover, if the Parties wished to restrict sulfur dioxide, they would need
to implement a novel category dependent upon the purpose, manner, and/or
location of emissions, because much larger amounts of sulfur dioxide are
already anthropogenically produced while sulfur-based SAI SRM field
research would constitute a relatively small contribution.172
165.
Vienna Convention, supra note 78, art. 1.2, 2.2(b).
166.
See McKenzie et al., supra note 163, at 188 (“[C]hanges in ozone can induce
changes in climate, and vice versa.”).
167.
See T.M.L. Wigley, A Combined Mitigation/Geoengineering Approach to Climate
Stabilization, 314 SCIENCE 452, 452 (2006) (explaining that the risk of SAI on stratospheric
ozone “is likely to be small”).
168.
THE ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 25, at 31 (describing aerosol’s reflective
properties).
169.
See Wigley, supra note 167, at 452 (noting the contradictory and uncertain effects
generated from computer models predicting the outcome of SAI SRM deployment).
170.
See Vienna Convention, supra note 78, art. 2 (outlining the obligations of parties
to CPOL).
171.
See Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer art. 2.9, 2.10,
Sept. 16, 1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3 (prohibiting certain substances due to their effect on
stratospheric ozone).
172.
See Justin McClellan et al., Cost Analysis of Stratospheric Albedo Modification
Delivery Systems, 7 ENVTL. RESEARCH LETTERS 034019, 1 (2012) (estimating that full SAI
SRM implementation would inject one to five teragrams of sulfur per year, which would be
spread globally); S.J. Smith et al., Anthropogenic Sulfur Dioxide Emissions: 1850–2005, 11
ATMOSPHERIC CHEMISTRY & PHYSICS 1101, 1110 (2011) (placing actual global
anthropogenic sulfur emissions at approximately fifty-eight teragrams per year, which are
concentrated in North America and Europe).
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In fact, it is possible to argue that the Vienna Convention favors
climate engineering research. As noted above, climate change will impact
the ozone layer.173 Parties must “take appropriate measures . . . . to protect
human health and the environment against adverse effects resulting or
likely to result from human activities which modify or are likely to modify
the ozone layer.”174 Climate engineering has the potential to reduce the
adverse effects of climate change and secondarily may be able to reduce
harm from stratospheric ozone depletion.175 Specifically, the Vienna
Convention commits Parties to undertake and cooperate in “research and
scientific assessment on: The physical and chemical processes that may
affect the ozone layer . . . [c]limatic effects deriving from any modifications
of the ozone layer . . . [and] [s]ubstances, practices, processes and activities
that may affect the ozone layer, and their cumulative effects.”176 In this
context, sulfur dioxide is a substance and SAI SRM climate engineering is
an activity that may affect the ozone layer and the climate. If there is a
significant probability that SAI SRM might be deployed in the future, then
research into the proposed techniques would improve understanding of its
potential impact on stratospheric ozone.177
E. Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution
The Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution
(LRTAP Convention) is a framework agreement, supplemented with
protocols, which was developed under the auspices of the UN Economic
Commission for Europe (UNECE) in order to reduce acid rain due to
transboundary air pollution.178 With respect to climate engineering in
general, the LRTAP Convention encourages research.179 Notably,
173.
See McKenzie, supra note 166, at 183 (describing the negative effects that climate
change may have).
174.
See Vienna Convention, supra note 78, art. 2.1 (obligating Parties to actively try
and reduce the adverse effects of modifications to stratospheric ozone).
175.
See supra notes 24–34 and accompanying text (describing the emergence of
climate engineering).
176.
Id. art. 3; see also art. 2.2(a), 4, Annex I (encouraging similar research to better
understand the impact that human activities have on the ozone layer).
177.
See THE ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 25, at ix (advocating research into “whether
low risk methods can be made available if it becomes necessary to reduce the rate of
warming this century”).
178.
See LRTAP Convention, supra note 74, art. 2 (listing the fundamental principles
of the LRTAP Convention). The United States, Canada, and the majority of European
countries are Parties to the LRTAP Convention. See 1302 U.N.T.S. 217, n.1 (noting which
countries have ratified the LRTAP Convention).
179.
See id. art. 7 (advising parties to the convention to undertake research and
development of existing and proposed technologies).
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greenhouse gases and global warming likely qualify under the Convention
as “long-range transboundary air pollution”:
“Air Pollution” means the introduction by man, directly or
indirectly, of substances or energy into the air resulting in
deleterious effects of such a nature as to endanger human
health, harm living resources and ecosystems and material
property and impair or interfere with amenities and other
legitimate uses of the environment . . . .180
This definition appears to require that “deleterious effects” have already
occurred, which is arguably the case with climate change.181 The “longrange transboundary” qualifier adds requirements for transboundary effects
and for multiple individual sources that cannot readily be distinguished.182
Given this, the LRTAP Convention can be seen as encouraging climate
engineering research in three ways. First, it commits Parties to conduct and
cooperate in research, including in the “economic, social and environmental
assessment[s] of alternative measures for attaining environmental
objectives including the reduction of long-range transboundary air
pollution.”183 Climate engineering is an alternative measure for reducing
global warming, which would likely be considered a long-range
transboundary air pollutant.184 Second, recalling that SRM is projected to
have low financial costs, this technique should fall within the commitment
that, “in order to combat air pollution [Parties are] to develop the best
policies and strategies . . . in particular by using the best available
technology which is economically feasible and low- and non-waste
technology.”185 Third, in its 1994 Oslo Protocol,186 “precautionary
measures” are not only meant to “prevent or minimize emissions of air

180.
Id. art. 1; see also SANDS & PEEL, supra note 74, at 247 (discussing this
definitional issue).
181.
See LRTAP Convention, supra note 74, art. 5 (“Consultations shall be
held . . . between, on the one hand, Contracting Parties which are actually affected
by . . . long-range transboundary air pollution and, on the other hand, Contracting Parties
within which and subject to whose jurisdiction a significant contribution to long-range
transboundary air pollution originates . . . .”).
182.
See id. art. 1 (defining long-range transboundary air pollution).
183.
Id. art. 7.
184.
See id. art. 1 (defining “long-range transboundary air pollution” to include effects
that “endanger human health, harm living resources and ecosystems”).
185.
Id.
186.
Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution on
Further Reduction of Sulphur Emissions, June 13, 1994, 2030 U.N.T.S. 122 [hereinafter
Oslo Protocol].
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pollutants” but also to “mitigate their adverse effects” and “should be costeffective.”187
Field experiments of sulfur-based SAI SRM present a special case
for the LRTAP Convention treaty regime, with the 1985 Helsinki,188 1994
Oslo, and 1999 Gothenburg Protocols being applicable.189 Most
importantly, the Gothenburg Protocol contains restrictions regarding “new
stationary sources.”190 These new stationary sources must not exceed
certain sulfur emission limits which vary by categories such as combustion
plants and oil refineries.191 Of course, it is possible that the Implementation
Committee, which reviews compliance, and the governing Executive Body
could exempt sulfur-based SAI SRM field tests from the Gothenburg
Protocol restrictions because the production of acid rain within the covered
UNECE region from this source of sulfur would be minimal due to the high
emission altitude and subsequent atmospheric mixing.192 Furthermore, there
are a few exceptions to the sulfur emission limits for which the field tests
might qualify.193 Nevertheless, barring action by the LRTAP Convention
187.
Id. at pmbl. ¶¶ 3, 4.
188.
Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution on
the Reduction of Sulphur Emissions or Their Transboundary Fluxes By at Least 30 Per Cent,
July 8, 1985, 1480 U.N.T.S. 215 [hereinafter Helsinki Protocol].
189.
Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution to
Abate Acidification, Eutrophication and Ground-level Ozone, Nov. 30, 1999, 2319 U.N.T.S.
81 [hereinafter Gothenburg Protocol]. A handful of States, including some larger ones, are
not parties to these protocols. Most importantly, the United States has not ratified the Oslo
Protocol, nor has Russia. See Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range
Transboundary Air Pollution on Further Reduction of Sulphur Emissions, UNITED NATIONS
TREATY
COLLECTION,
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?sr
c=TREA
TY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-1-e&chapter=27&lang=en (last visited May 7, 2014, 1:44 PM)
(listing the countries that have ratified the Oslo Protocol). Canada has not ratified the
Gothenburg Protocol, nor has Russia. See UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION,
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-1h&chapter=27&lang=en (last visited May 7, 2014, 1:48 PM) (listing the parties that have
ratified the Gothenberg Protocol).
190.
See Gothenburg Protocol, supra note 189, art. 1 (defining new stationary sources).
191.
See id. art. 3.2, Annex IV (establishing limits on sulfur emissions from stationary
sources). New mobile sources are similarly regulated. See id. art. 3.5, Annex VIII
(establishing limit values and “environmental specifications for marketed fuels for
vehicles”). SAI tests do not seem to fall clearly into any particular category.
192.
See id. art. 9 (discussing the powers of the Implementation Committee); id. art. 10
(requiring review of “data on the effects of concentrations and depositions of sulphur and
nitrogen compounds and of photochemical pollution”); see also IPCC, PHYSICAL SCIENCE,
supra note 1, FAQ 7.3 (“There has also been some concern that sulphate aerosol SRM
would increase acid rain, but model studies suggest that acid rain is probably not a major
concern since the rate of acid rain production from stratospheric aerosol SRM would be
much smaller than values currently produced by pollution sources.”).
193.
See Gothenburg Protocol, supra note 189, Annex IV, tbl.1, n.a (providing a short
list of exceptions to the limit values).
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institutions and possible exceptions, these sulfur-based SAI SRM field tests
appear to be prohibited in the Parties’ territory by the Gothenburg
Protocol.194
More generally, sulfur-based SAI SRM field experiments would be
regulated as a contribution to each Party’s total emissions.195 For example,
they would be subject to reporting requirements, which are disaggregated
by source categories and approximate locations.196 Further implications for
sulfur-based SAI SRM field experiments would depend on their scale
because, although sulfur-based SAI SRM would be a small contribution to
global sulfur emissions, large experiments could greatly increase total
emissions of individual countries.197 At small scales, such field tests would
be generally encouraged per the provisions cited above and by the Oslo
Protocol’s commitment for Parties to “encourage research, development,
monitoring and cooperation related to . . . [t]he understanding of the wider
effects of sulfur emissions on human health, the environment.”198 Field tests
of sulfur-based SAI SRM large enough to significantly increase a country’s
total emissions may be prohibited by the softly-worded commitment in the
LRTAP Convention that Parties are to “endeavor to limit and, as far as
possible, gradually reduce and prevent air pollution”199 and by the first
194.
See id. art. 2 (stating the objectives of the Protocol, which include reducing sulfur
emissions).
195.
See generally LRTAP Convention, supra note 74 (addressing how Parties’
emissions into the atmosphere are regulated).
196.
See id. art. 8 (providing for an exchange of information for Parties to the
agreement); Helsinki Protocol, supra note 188, art. 4 (requiring annual reporting of sulfur
emission levels); Oslo Protocol, supra note 187, art. 5 (requiring periodic reporting of
national annual sulfur emissions); Gothenburg Protocol, supra note 189, art. 7 (requiring
periodic reporting of sulfur emissions). The Executive Body of the Convention determines
the source categories, and the locations are in “grid-units of agreed size.” See LRTAP
Convention, supra note 74, art. 10 (establishing an “Executive Body” and defining the
parameters of its authority).
197.
See Gothenburg Protocol, supra note 189, Annex IV (establishing limit values for
sulfur emissions from stationary sources). Assuming that a large-scale field test would be
one-tenth the magnitude of deployment, and taking the midpoint of the estimated range for
deployment, such a test could emit 0.3 teragrams of sulfur per year. See MacMynowski et
al., supra note 54, at 5044 (calculating to what extent uncertainty could be reduced through
an SRM field test of one-tenth of the deployment intensity needed to counteract the warming
from a doubling of atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration); McClellan et al., supra note
172, § 2.1 (estimating the amount of sulfur needed for SAI SRM deployment). This would
be 1.5 times the current sulfur emissions of the United Kingdom or Germany. See EUROPEAN
ENVT. AGENCY, EUROPEAN UNION EMISSION INVENTORY REPORT 1990–2010 UNDER THE
UNECE CONVENTION ON LONG-RANGE TRANSBOUNDARY AIR POLLUTION 52–54 (2012)
(discussing current sulfur emissions of European countries).
198.
Oslo Protocol, supra note 187, art. 6; see also supra notes 182–191 and
accompanying text.
199.
LRTAP Convention, supra note 74, art. 2.
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obligation of the Oslo Protocol that its Parties “shall control and reduce
their sulfur emissions.”200 These tests would furthermore be contrary to the
objective of the Gothenburg Protocol.201 In reality, Parties sometimes do
have significant increases in their total emissions while remaining below
their emission reduction commitments.202 The Implementation Committee,
however, has apparently not addressed these significant below-limit
increases in its reports to the Executive Body.203 Such a below-limit
increase would most likely be judged by the other Parties and the
Implementation Committee in its full context, including whether highaltitude sulfate emissions from tests would be deposited within the Parties’
territory or, alternatively, would be diluted and deposited over a much
larger area.204 If field tests would be “a significant contribution to longrange transboundary air pollution,” then a potentially affected state could
request consultations with the source state.205 Field tests of sulfur-based
SAI SRM that would cause a Party to the Oslo or Gothenburg Protocols to
exceed its sulfur emissions limit would be prohibited.206
F. Outer Space Treaty
The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other
200.
Oslo Protocol, supra note 187, art. 2.1; see also arts. 2.4, 4.1(b) (discussing the
commitments to reduce emissions).
201.
See Gothenburg Protocol, supra note 189, art. 2.1 (stating the Protocol’s objective
to reduce sulfur emissions).
202.
See European Environment Agency, supra note 197, at 11–12 (discussing
siginificant emissions increases from 1990 to 2010); Oslo Protocol, supra note 187, Annex
II (creating sulfur ceilings but not addressing significant below-limit increases); Gothenburg
Protocol, supra note 189, Annex II (establishing sulfur ceilings but, again, not addressing
significant below-limit increases).
203.
See, e.g., Fifteenth Report of the Implementation Committee to the Executive
Body for the Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution, 31st Sess., Dec. 11–
13, 2012, ECE/EB.AIR/2012/16 (reporting on the implementation of the LRTAP
Convention) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND
THE ENVIRONMENT).
204.
See generally LRTAP Convention, supra note 74 (establishing parameters for
evaluating increases in sulfur emissions).
205.
See id. art. 5 (requiring consultations “upon request, at an early stage,
between, . . . Parties which are actually affected by or exposed to a significant risk of longrange transboundary air pollution and, on the other hand, Contracting Parties within
which . . . long-range transboundary air pollution originates”).
206.
See Oslo Protocol, supra note 187, Annex II (providing limits for sulfur
emissions); Gothenburg Protocol, supra note 189, Annex II (providing new limits for sulfur
emissions as of 1999). For example, Germany and the United Kingdom could presently
perform experiments where they emit up to one sixth and one third of their allotted sulfur
emissions respectively. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
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Celestial Bodies (the Outer Space Treaty) is the most important
international instrument in space law.207 All nations that have a space
program are Parties to the Outer Space Treaty.208 Proposals to place objects
in space, either in Earth or solar orbit, have long been considered potential
SRM methods, in part because they could be very effective and would not
interfere directly in ecosystems, even though they are consistently assessed
as economically infeasible.209 Evaluating the role of international law for
space-based climate engineering research is complicated by the fact that, to
a greater degree than other suggested methods, there could be little
distinction between field research and deployment.
In general, the Outer Space Treaty and related agreements permit
research on space-based SRM methods by, for example, establishing
“freedom of scientific investigation in outer space,” and committing States
to cooperate therein.210 Parties are to conduct space activities “for the
benefit and in the interests of all countries”211 and “with due regard to the
corresponding interests of all other States Parties.”212 A subsequent UN
General Assembly resolution addressed this potentially unclear passage,
indicating that it is intended to encourage consideration of developing
countries’ needs and to stimulate voluntary cooperation, and not to imply
veto rights on other countries’ activities in space.213 The Outer Space Treaty

207.
See generally Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Dec.
19, 1966, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]; THE UNITED NATIONS AT
WORK 41 (Martin Ira Glassner ed., 1998) (“The most important of the UN space law
instrumetns has been the [Outer Space Treaty] . . . .”).
208.
See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, UNITED NATIONS
TREATY
COLLECTION,
https://treaties.un.org/pages/showDetails.aspx?
objid=0800000280128cbd (last visited May 7, 2014, 2:12 PM) (listing parties to the Outer
Space Treaty) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND
THE ENVIRONMENT).
209.
See THE ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 25, at 32–34 (explaining that light refraction
from space could be a possible SRM method, however, it would be prohibitively expensive).
210.
See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 207, art. I (“There shall be freedom of
scientific investigation in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, and
States shall facilitate and encourage international cooperation in such investigation.”).
211.
Id. art. I.
212.
Id. art. IX.
213.
See generally Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking into Particular
Account the Needs of Developing Countries, G.A. Res. 122, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp.
No. 49, at 114, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/122 (Dec. 13, 1966) (addressing the obligations and
powers of States with space programs and States without space programs under the Outer
Space Treaty); see also FRANCIS LYALL & PAUL B. LARSEN, SPACE LAW: A TREATISE, 63–65
(2009) (explaining the prevailing desire, particularly among countries with space programs,
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requires communication, that is, to inform the UN, the scientific
community, and the public about relevant activities.214 Finally, other
international laws, including the customary law regarding transboundary
harm, also apply in space.215
The most detailed applicable provisions under space law are those
regarding liability, which could present a disincentive toward researching
space-based SRM.216 The Outer Space Treaty and the Convention on
International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects hold Parties
responsible for their space-based activities and absolutely liable for damage
caused by launched objects.217 This liability is not restricted to accidents,
malfunctions, or to damage from direct contact with launched objects, but
instead includes damage from objects that remain in orbit and continue to
function as intended.218 Because the definition of “damage” is limited to
that occurring to persons and property, recoverable damage to the
environment would include only its economic value possessed by natural or
legal persons.219 The agreements, however, are silent on how direct the
causation must be.220 Scholars generally agree that indirect and nonphysical
damage is covered, but have divergent opinions regarding how direct the
that the benefit and interests be “met simply by the activities being beneficial in a
generalised way”).
214.
See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 207, art. XI (instituting a requirement that
signatory Parties report to the UN Secretary General, and inform the public and scientific
community of the nature of their interstellar activities).
215.
See id. art. III (placing the Outer Space Treaty under the purview of international
law).
216.
See id. art. VII (establishing liability for any state that launches objects into space).
217.
See Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects,
pt. B, art. II, Nov. 29, 1971, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Space Liability Convention]
(creating absolute liability for damage to the surface of Earth or to aircraft).
218.
See Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, princ. 8, G.A. Res. 1962, U.N. GAOR 18th Sess.,
Supp. No. 15, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/RES/18/1962 (Dec. 13, 1963) (“[E]ach State from whose
territory or facility an object is launched, is internationally liable for damage to a foreign
State or to its natural or juridical persons by such object or its component parts on the Earth,
in air space, or in outer space.”). The Outer Space Treaty and the Space Liability Convention
make no reference to accidents or malfunctions nor to direct physical contact, but States are
“internationally liable for damage to a foreign State or to its natural or juridical persons by
such object or its component parts on the Earth, in air space, or in outer space.” Id. ¶ 8.
219.
See Space Liability Convention, supra note 217, art. I(a) (“The term ‘damage’
means loss of life, personal injury or other impairment of health; or loss of or damage to
property of States or of persons, natural or juridical, or property of international
intergovernmental organizations.”); see also LOTTA VIIKARI, THE ENVIRONMENTAL ELEMENT
IN SPACE LAW: ASSESSING THE PRESENT AND CHARTING THE FUTURE 68–69 (2008)
(discussing the scope of liability created under the Space Liability Convention).
220.
See, e.g., Space Liability Convention, supra note 217, art. XII (invoking
“international law and the principles of justice and equity,” and implying inclusion of
indirectly-caused and delayed damages).
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causation must be.221 This disagreement is further complicated by the fact
that proving causation in a dispute over the effects of space-based SRM
testing or deployment would be very difficult. It is important to note that
the Space Liability Convention has an article concerning catastrophic risks
from space objects that requires the responsible state to “examine the
possibility of rendering appropriate and rapid assistance.”222
G. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is a
comprehensive international agreement describing the rights and duties of
States in their marine activities, including the protection of the marine
environment and the conduct of marine scientific research.223 Some
proposed climate engineering methods and their field research would occur
in or over the ocean, such as ocean fertilization, MCB, and (possibly)
SAI.224 UNCLOS also applies to land-based activities that affect the marine
environment.225 States under UNCLOS have rights and obligations that will
impact climate engineering field experiments in a complex manner.226
The desire to protect the marine environment is evident throughout
UNCLOS, under which “States have the obligation to protect and preserve
the marine environment.”227 This is without qualification and exception.
Furthermore, Parties have obligations “to take . . . such measures . . . for the
living resources of the high seas . . . to prevent, reduce and control pollution

221.
Compare W.F. Foster, The Convention on International Liability for Damage
Caused by Space Objects, 10 CAN. YEARBOOK INT’L L. 137, 158 (1972) (discussing liability
for damages caused by space objects), with Carl Q. Christol, International Liability for
Damage Caused by Space Objects, 74 AM. J. INT’L L. 346, 358–62 (1980) (reviewing
various interpretations of the Treaty). Scholars generally agree that indirect and nonphysical
damage is covered, however. See Foster, supra, at 155 (“Moreover, it is immaterial whether
the injuries are suffered through physical impact . . . .”); Christol, supra, at 362 (“[I]t may be
anticipated that the convention will be interpreted as covering both direct and indirect
damage . . . .”).
222.
See Space Liability Convention, supra note 217, art. XXI (establishing state
responsibility for catastrophic injury).
223.
See generally UNCLOS, supra note 73 (setting out the rights and obligations of
any state that engages activities on the seas).
224.
See supra notes 23–45 and accompanying text (providing an overview of such
methods).
225.
See UNCLOS, supra note 73, art. 207 (“States shall adopt laws and regulations to
prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from land-based
sources . . . .” ).
226.
See generally id. (discussing, at length, the rights and obligations of States with
respect to the seas).
227.
Id. art. 192.
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of the marine environment from any source . . . .”;228 to ensure “that
activities under their jurisdiction or control are so conducted as not to cause
damage by pollution to other States and their environment, and that
pollution arising from incidents or activities under their jurisdiction or
control does not spread beyond the areas where they exercise sovereign
rights . . . .”229; and to “take all measures necessary to prevent, reduce and
control pollution of the marine environment resulting from the use of
technologies under their jurisdiction or control . . . .”230 The States are also
required to assess and to communicate the expected effects of “substantial
pollution of or significant and harmful changes to the marine environment”
caused by activities under their control.231 Importantly, “pollution of the
marine environment” is defined, as in the LRTAP Convention, to include
“the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into
the marine environment,”232 but in this case with a lower threshold of
certainty.233 This definition includes greenhouse gases and probably global
warming.234 Under UNCLOS, pollution is not limited to marine-based
sources, although the pollution must enter the marine environment.235
Furthermore, States are to prevent marine pollution “from any source”
including “from land-based sources [or] from or through the
atmosphere.”236 Not only will climate change warm the ocean, but elevated
atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations will also acidify it, and both
processes will have deleterious effects.237 These effects imply a need to
balance the risks to the marine environment from climate engineering
research with those from climate change. UNCLOS, however, provides that
“States shall act so as not to transfer, directly or indirectly, damage or
hazards from one area to another or transform one type of pollution into
228.
Id. art. 117.
229.
Id. art. 194.
230.
Id. art. 196.
231.
See id. arts. 204–06 (discussing monitoring and assessing effects on the marine
environment).
232.
Id. art. 1.1(4).
233.
See supra note 180 and accompanying text (providing the LRTAP Convention
definition).
234.
See UNCLOS, supra note 73, art. 1 (including “deleterious effects as harm to
living resources and marine life, hazards to human health, hindrance to marine
activities, . . . impairment of quality for use of sea water and reduction of amenities” in the
definition of pollution to the marine environment).
235.
See id. art. 204 (“States shall . . . observe, measure, evaluate and analyse, by
recognized scientific methods, the risks or effects of pollution of the marine environment.”).
236.
Id. art. 194.
237.
See IPCC, IMPACTS, supra note 16, § 6 (“Climate change alters physical, chemical,
and biological properties of the ocean . . . Impacts of ocean acidification range from changes
in organismal physiology and behavior to population dynamics . . . . and will affect marine
ecosystems for centuries if emissions continue.”).
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another.”238 Scholars dispute this article’s impact on climate engineering.239
Regardless of its impact, research projects of limited scale would not have
the intention of transferring hazards, but of learning whether climate
engineering deployment would have deleterious effects on the environment
and whether it would indeed transfer hazards.240
UNCLOS is generally supportive of scientific research at sea.241
Although “marine scientific research” remains undefined under UNCLOS,
the various definitions considered during negotiations and proposed after
the text was finalized all included the research of climate engineering
techniques, which intervene in the ocean, and likely also those that operate
in the atmosphere above the ocean.242 For example, one of the last proposed
238.
UNCLOS, supra note 73, art. 195.
239.
Compare Philomene Verlaan, Geo-Engineering, the Law of the Sea, and Climate
Change, 2009 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 446, 457–58 (2009) (arguing that climate
engineering projects would likely violate article 195, and that the burden is on the projects’
proponents to demonstrate that it would not), with James Edward Peterson, Can Algae Save
Civilization: A Look at Technology, Law, and Policy Regarding Iron Fertilization of the
Ocean to Counteract the Greenhouse Effect, 6 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 61, 92
(1995) (asserting that article 195 would apply only if the intervention ocean fertilization
were to be shown to have harmful environmental effects).
240.
See THE ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 25, at ix (stating that one purpose of research
is to avoid “methods which involve activities or effects that extend beyond national
boundaries”); but see GREGOR BETZ ET AL., LARGE SCALE INTENTIONAL INTERVENTIONS INTO
THE CLIMATE SYSTEM?: ASSESSING THE CLIMATE ENGINEERING DEBATE 31 (Wilfried Rickels
et
al.
eds.,
2011),
available
at
http://www.fona.de/mediathek/pdf/Climate_Engineering_engl.pdf (“By carrying out
research into and planning for climate engineering, one passes on risks that arise today to
future generations.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE,
AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
241.
See UNCLOS, supra note 73, pmbl. ¶ 4, arts. 87.1, 88, 238–239, 243, 251, 255,
257 (recognizing the importance of supporting research at sea).
242.
See UNITED NATIONS DIVISION FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA,
OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, THE LAW OF THE SEA: MARINE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH: A REVISED
GUIDE TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 4–6 (2010) (reviewing definitions of marine scientific
research which were considered during drafting); see also GEORGE K. WALKER, DEFINITIONS
FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA: TERMS NOT DEFINED BY THE 1982 CONVENTION 241–44 (2011)
(discussing the meanings of marine scientific research). Whether research is conducted in,
on, or above the high seas does not matter; although it is unclear under UNCLOS whether
research conducted in the atmosphere above a nation’s exclusive economic zone and
continental shelves is considered marine research. See FLORIAN H. TH. WEGELEIN, MARINE
SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH: THE OPERATION AND STATUS OF RESEARCH VESSELS AND OTHER
PLATFORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 251–255 (2005) (discussing the legal regime of air
space located over the high seas, contiguous zones, and exclusive economic zones). The
most relevant question, however, is whether climate engineering research would increase
knowledge of the “marine environment,” a phrase that is undefined but generally interpreted
to include the marine atmosphere. See ALFRED H.A. SOONS, MARINE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 124 (1982) (analyzing the meaning of “marine scientific
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definitions to be included in a negotiating text was “any study or related
experimental work designed to increase man’s knowledge of the marine
environment.”243 Parties commit to promote marine scientific research and
to create favorable conditions for it, as well as to promote cooperation and
communication in research.244 It must be conducted “using appropriate
scientific methods and means,” for peaceful purposes, in a manner
consistent with other international law, and in a manner that does not
“unjustifiably interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea.”245 Most
pertinently, Parties’ right to research is subject to their obligation to protect
the marine environment.246 States and sponsoring international
organizations may be held liable for damage caused by pollution due to
research or by actions in contravention of the agreement.247
Some of the rights and obligations concerning marine scientific
research vary by the location of the proposed activity.248 Within territorial
waters,249 coastal States “have the exclusive right to regulate, authorize and
conduct marine scientific research,” and research therein requires their
express consent.250 In the exclusive economic zones and continental
shelves, coastal States have a similar right, but they are to grant consent “in
research”); see also VERONICA FRANK, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND MARINE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA: IMPLEMENTING
GLOBAL OBLIGATIONS AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL 12 (2007) (discussing the lack of definition
for “marine environment”). Regardless, considering the expected impact of climate change
and climate engineering on the ocean, atmospheric climate engineering research would
qualify as marine scientific research. See Karen N. Scott, Regulating Ocean Fertilization
Under International Law: The Risks, CARBON AND CLIMATE L. REV. 108, 109–10 (2013)
(describing the impacts of climate change and fertilization on the ocean).
243.
Informal Single Negotiating Text, Third United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea, Part III, Part II, art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8/Part III (1982).
244.
See UNCLOS, supra note 73, arts. 239, 242–44, 250 (providing that States shall
promote and facilitate marine scientific research in accordance with the Convention).
245.
Id. art. 240 (providing general principles for scientific research).
246.
See id. arts. 192, 238 (discussing States’ general obligation to protect the marine
environment and States’ rights to conduct scientific research).
247.
See id. art. 263 (“States . . . shall be responsible and liable for the measures they
take in contravention of this Convention . . . . States . . . shall be responsible and liable
pursuant to article 235 for damage caused by pollution of the marine environment arising out
of marine scientific research undertaken by them or on their behalf.”). If a climate
engineering research activity were to be considered “pollution of the marine environment”
instead of “marine scientific research,” liability would be independent of any violation of
law. See id. art. 235 (“[States] shall be liable in accordance with international law.”).
248.
See id. arts. 245–46 (explaining scientific research rights available in the territorial
sea, the exclusive economic zone, and the continental shelf).
249.
See id. art. 2 (“The sovereignty of a coastal State extends . . . to an adjacent belt of
sea, described as the territorial sea.”).
250.
See id. art. 245 (providing guidelines for marine scientific research in a States’
territorial sea).
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normal circumstances” to researching States and “competent international
organizations.”251 There, the coastal State must exercise this and other
rights with due regard for other States, and the researching State must have
due regard for the coastal State and comply with the coastal State’s laws
and regulations.252 On the high seas, States and international organizations
have the right to conduct research, but this must be performed with due
regard for other States.253 Research conducted within the “Area”254 is
subject to additional requirements, particularly that it is “for the common
benefit of mankind as a whole” and that results are shared.255
A special note must be made of ocean fertilization and its research,
which may or may not qualify as “dumping.” As defined in UNCLOS,
“dumping,” in part, is “any deliberate disposal of wastes or other
matter . . . at sea,” but excludes “placement of matter for a purpose other
than the mere disposal thereof.”256 UNCLOS Parties have committed to
prevent, reduce, and control pollution of the sea by dumping.257 Coastal
States have the right to permit, regulate, and control dumping within their
territorial waters, exclusive economic zones, and continental shelf, but must
consider how other States may be impacted.258 Parties are to establish
global rules regarding dumping, and their national laws must be no less
effective than these global rules.259

251.
See id. art. 246 (providing guidelines for marine scientific research in the exclusive
economic zone and the continental shelf). UNCLOS details circumstances under which
coastal States may withhold their consent, as well as the duties of the States and international
organizations who conduct such research. See id. arts. 246–49, 252–54 (detailing state and
researchers’ rights and obligations concerning marine environmental research).
252.
See id. arts. 56, 58 (discussing the rights and duties of various States within the
exclusive economic zone).
253.
See id. arts. 87, 257 (providing for the freedom to research on the high seas and the
right to perform research beyond exclusive economic zones).
254.
See id. art. 1 (“‘Area’ means the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof,
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.”).
255.
See id. art. 143 (covering permissible marine scientific research in the Area).
256.
Id. art. 1.1(5).
257.
See id. arts. 194.3(a), 210 (requiring States to take measures against pollution of
the marine environment, including dumping).
258.
See id. art. 210.5 (providing guidelines for dumping in certain areas). Dumping by
other States in these areas requires permission from the coastal state. See id. (“Dumping
within the territorial sea and the exclusive economic zone or onto the continental shelf shall
not be carried out without the express prior approval of the coastal State . . . .”).
259.
See id. arts. 210.4, 210.6 (discussing the establishment and effectiveness of
Parties’ global, regional, and national rules concerning pollution).
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H. London Convention and London Protocol
The London Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by
Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter and its London Protocol (together,
the LC-LP) are two MEAs that regulate dumping at sea.260 The former has
eighty-seven parties, whereas the latter—intended to replace the former—
currently has forty-two parties.261 These MEAs use essentially the same
definition for “dumping” as UNCLOS; thus, ocean fertilization could
potentially be classified under these MEAs as dumping.262 In response to a
private company that intended to conduct field experiments using a flag of
convenience and a negative assessment of ocean fertilization in the Fourth
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the
Contracting Parties to the LC-LP took up the issue and began to develop a
nonbinding regulatory framework for ocean fertilization.263
The regulatory framework adopted by the LC-LP Parties rests upon
two new definitions provided in their 2008 decision. First, “ocean
fertilization is any activity . . . with the principle intention of stimulating
primary productivity in the oceans [excluding] conventional aquaculture, or
260.
See generally Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of
Wastes and Other Matter art. I, Nov. 13, 1972, 1046 U.N.T.S. 120 [hereinafter London
Convention] (providing the terms of the London Convention, requiring States to prevent
pollution of the sea caused by dumping); Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of
Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter 1972 art. 3.4, Nov. 7, 1996, 11
U.K.T.S. Cm. 4078 [hereinafter London Protocol] (adopting stricter measures for preventing
dumping).
261.
See Office for the London Convention and Protocol, London Convention and
Protocol,
INTERNATIONAL
MARITIME
ORGANIZATION,
http://www.imo.org/blast/mainframemenu.asp?topic_id=1488 (last visited Jan. 8, 2014)
(listing signatories) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE,
AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
262.
Compare UNCLOS, supra note 73, art 1.1(5) (defining “dumping”), with London
Convention, supra note 260, art. III.1 (defining actions that “dumping” does and does not
include), and London Protocol, supra note 260, art. 1.4 (same). The two definitions differ in
ways that are not relevant to this paper, but the London Convention preceded UNCLOS and
is thus the origin of the definition.
263.
Russ George, the CEO of Planktos, Inc. threatened to use a flag of convenience
after the Environmental Protection Agency, which is responsible for implementing the
London Convention in the United States, sent a letter to the company. See United States,
Planktos, Inc., Large-scale Ocean Iron Addition Projects, I.M.O. Doc. LC/SG 30/INF.28
(June 1, 2007) (discussing Planktos Inc.’s dispute with the EPA over ocean iron addition
projects); Report of the Thirtieth Meeting of the Scientific Group of the London Convention
and the First Meeting of the Scientific Group of the London Protocol, ¶ 2.22, I.M.O. Doc.
LC/SG 31/16 (July 25, 2007) (reporting on the decision-making process of the LC-LP in its
regulation of ocean fertilization); see also Resolution LC-LP.1 on the Regulation of Ocean
Fertilization pmbl. ¶ 3, I.M.O. Doc. LC 10/16/Annex 6 (Oct. 31, 2008) [hereinafter LCLP.1] (noting that States are encouraged to study and understand ocean iron fertilization).
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mariculture, or the creation of artificial reefs.”264 The Parties decided that
ocean fertilization indeed falls within the scope of the LC-LP and that it, in
general, should not be allowed.265 An exception to this prohibition was
made for the second new definition, “legitimate scientific research.”266
Distinguishing legitimate scientific research from illegitimate ocean
fertilization requires an assessment framework, described in the Parties’
2010 decision.267 Under this framework, researchers apply to the
appropriate regulatory agency of their home state for approval to conduct
scientific research.268
The assessment consists of two stages. The first is an initial review
to determine whether the proposal is, in fact, a scientific one that would be
subject to peer review and would not result in financial gain for the
researchers.269 The second is a more elaborate environmental assessment,
which includes, among other things, an assessment of exposure effects, risk
characterization, and risk management.270 Notably, the risk management
procedures should be based on a “precautionary approach,” and the
decision whether to reject the proposal or to ask for revisions should take
into account this precautionary approach.271 During the second phase, the
researching Party is also to notify potentially affected countries, and to

264.
LC-LP.1, supra note 263, ¶ 2 n.3. Primary production is the creation of organic
matter from carbon dioxide, usually through photosynthesis. See THE ROYAL SOCIETY, supra
note 25, at 79 (defining primary production as “[a]ll forms of production accomplished by
plants”).
265.
See LC-LP.1, supra note 263, ¶ 8 (“[O]cean fertilization activities other than
legitimate scientific research should not be allowed.”).
266.
See id. ¶ 3 (providing an exception for placement of matter for research purposes).
267.
See Resolution LC-LP.2 on the Assessment Framework for Scientific Research
Involving Ocean Fertilization, I.M.O. Doc. LC 32/15/Annex 6 (Oct. 14, 2010) (adopting a
framework to guide case-by-case assessment of research proposals).
268.
See id. (determining what constitutes scientific research under the London
Convention and Protocol); see also Assessment Framework for Scientific Research
Involving Ocean Fertilization § 1, in Report of the Thirty-Second Consultative Meeting and
the Fifth Meeting of Contracting Parties, I.M.O. Doc. LC 32/13/Annex 6 (Oct. 14, 2012)
[hereinafter Assessment Framework] (providing a framework for assessing ocean
fertilization research proposals).
269.
See Assessment Framework, supra note 268, § 2 (detailing the initial assessment
process).
270.
See id. § 3 (discussing the environmental assessment process).
271.
See id. §§ 1.3.2.6, 4.3 (explaining that risk management procedures are
precautionary and that the decision to reject a proposal should take a precautionary approach
into account). The precautionary principle presumably refers to that of the London Protocol:
“it is important that States use the best practicable means to prevent such [marine]
pollution.” London Protocol, supra note 260, pmbl. ¶ 5.
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consult with stakeholders.272 If the project is approved, reports on the
impacts during a field experiment are to be regularly sent to the Secretariat,
and information from these reports can provide the basis to modify or to
revoke the authorization as well as to improve future decision-making.273
The LC-LP decisions have already come under challenge.274 In
2012, a private company conducted a large ocean fertilization experiment
without the approval of its home state, Canada.275 The company’s
representatives claimed that their intention was to increase salmon stocks
on behalf of a Native American village, thus potentially avoiding the
definition of ocean fertilization in the 2010 regulatory framework.276 After
this work was revealed, the Canadian government announced an
investigation into the ocean fertilization and the LC-LP Contracting Parties
issued a statement deeming this project to be ocean fertilization.277
272.
See Resolution LC-LP.2 on the Assessment Framework for Scientific Research
Involving Ocean Fertilization, supra note 268, § 1.8 (imposing consultation and notice
requirements on stakeholders).
273.
See id. §§ 5.1–5.2 (mandating s reports on the impacts of ocean fertilization for the
Secretariat and noting that the information from these reports must inform and improve
future decisionmaking).
274.
See Craik et al., supra note 94, at 120–21 (discussing inter alia recent ocean
fertilization activities which did not conform with LC-LP regulations).
275.
See id. at 117–18 (summarizing the company’s activities and claims).
276.
See id. (“The principals involved in the activity characterized it as an ocean
‘restoration’ project, aimed at enhancing decreasing salmon stocks. However, they also
made public statements indicating that they planned . . . to sell carbon credits on
international markets for the carbon dioxide they assumed would be sequestered by the
project.”). Stimulating primary production could be a means to achieve the goal of salmon
restoration or carbon sequestration. The issue thus appears to be the precise meaning of
“principle intention.” See id. at 122 (explaining that the principle intention of the experiment
was to enhance salmon stocks). To further complicate matters, the president of the
fertilization company, John Disney, claims that the boat was flying the village flag—
implying the absence of a Canadian flag—and that the experiment occurred beyond 200
miles from shore (beyond Canada’s exclusive economic zone) but within the marine territory
of the village, “which goes out to wherever they perceive the line to be based on where they
sit now in the legal world, which is under aboriginal rights and title.” See West Coast Ocean
NEWS
(Oct.
19,
2012),
Fertilization
Project
Defended,
CBC
http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/story/2012/10/19/bc-ocean-fertilization-haida.html
(reporting the location of the experiment and that it was purportedly within the marine
territory of a native village) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY,
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
277.
See Company Behind Ocean Fertilization Experiment Loses Court Bid to Block
Charges, THE CANADIAN PRESS (Feb. 4, 2014), http://www.cntvna.com/News/201402/04/cms133257article.shtml (“The organization behind a controversial ocean fertilization
experiment off the coast of British Columbia faces potentially 10 charges for environmental
violations after losing a court bid that would have brought an end to the investigation [by the
Canadian government].”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY,
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT); Report of the Thirty-Fourth Consultative Meeting of the
Contracting Parties to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of

462

5 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY CLIMATE & ENV’T 417 (2014)

In 2013, the Parties to the London Protocol (but not those to the
London Convention) approved an amendment to the London Protocol,
which, once accepted by two-thirds of the Parties, would implement a
broader and binding regulatory framework.278 The amendment specifically
defines “marine geoengineering,” which is not limited to ocean fertilization,
scientific research, or a particular goal:
“Marine geoengineering” means a deliberate intervention
in the marine environment to manipulate natural processes,
including to counteract anthropogenic climate change
and/or its impacts, and that has the potential to result in
deleterious effects, especially where those effects may be
widespread, long lasting or severe.279
The marine geoengineering activities listed in an accompanying proposed
annex are either prohibited outright or would require a permit from a
Party’s administrative government.280 For those activities which are listed
and do require a permit, Parties are to follow a general assessment
framework provided in a second proposed annex, as well as any other
assessment mechanism developed by the Parties for a specific activity.281
The general assessment framework for marine geoengineering activities
calls for a detailed description of the proposed activity, notification of
“potentially affected countries and relevant regional intergovernmental
agreements and arrangements,” and a consultation plan.282 Parties are
obligated to carry out a consultation process during the assessment phase,
and “[c]onsent should be sought from all countries with jurisdiction or
interests in the region of potential impact.”283 Both the Party responsible for
Wastes and Other Matter, 1972, and Seventh Meeting of Contracting Parties to the 1996
Protocol thereto, Doc. LC 34/15, Nov. 23, 2012, Annex 3 (expressing “grave concern” at the
ocean fertilization activity that took place in the Pacific Ocean off of the coast of Canada).
278.
See Res. LP.4(8) on the Amendment to the London Protocol to Regulate the
Placement of Matter for Ocean Fertilization and Other Marine Geoengineering Activities,
Oct. 18, 2013, Rep. of the Thirty-Fifth Consultative Meeting and the Eighth Meeting of
Contracting Parties, Doc. LC 35/15, Annex 4 (Oct. 21, 2013) (adopting an amendment to the
London Protocol to regulate marine geoengineering).
279.
Id. Annex 4, art.1.
280.
See id. Annex 4 (stating that Parties shall not allow listed marine geoengineering
activities unless the activity may be authorized by permit).
281.
See id. Annex 5 (imposing requirements on assessment frameworks).
282.
Id. Annex 5, ¶ 10 (“[P]otentially affected countries and relevant regional
intergovernmental agreements and arrangements should be identified and notified and a plan
should be developed for ongoing consultations on the potential impacts, and to encourage
scientific cooperation.”).
283.
Id. Annex 5, ¶ 11.
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the regulation as well as any potentially affected countries should seek
expert advice, including peer review.284 The ultimate assessment under the
general framework is to be based on the site, the matter to be placed in the
ocean, its expected effects, the proposed risk management, the means of
monitoring, the financial resources available, consultation requirements, the
environmental impact, and the expected benefits.285 Regarding the last two
criteria, the framework implicitly acknowledges the climate change/climate
engineering tension, in that it calls for “conditions [to be] in place to ensure
that, as far as practicable, environmental disturbance and detriment would
be minimized and the benefits maximized.”286 The proposed general
assessment framework also details considerations which must be met in
order for an activity to be “a specific marine scientific research activity,” a
subset of the more general “marine geoengineering activities” category.287
These requirements include: contributing to scientific knowledge, using
appropriate methodology, being subject to peer review, a commitment to
open publication of results, and a lack of personal economic interests.288 As
it is presently proposed, ocean fertilization is the only marine
geoengineering activity listed in the annex, which requires a permit and is
limited only to legitimate scientific research.289
I. Antarctic Treaty System
The Antarctic Treaty System governs relations among countries in
the area beyond sixty degrees latitude south, where some of the proposed
climate engineering methods, particularly ocean fertilization and SAI, could
be researched.290 Relevant here is the Antarctic Treaty and its Madrid
Protocol on Environmental Protection.291 Like UNCLOS, the Antarctic
284.
See id. Annex 5, ¶ 12 (stating that contracting Parties should consider advice for
proposals from international experts, and that advice should include peer review as
necessary).
285.
See id. Annex 5, ¶¶ 8–9 (detailing information required for assessment of a
proposal).
286.
Id. Annex 5, ¶ 26.5.
287.
Id. Annex 5, ¶¶ 7–9.
288.
See id. Annex 5, ¶ 8 (listing considerations that must be applied to determine
whether specific marine scientific research activity will be permitted).
289.
See id. Annex 5, ¶ 1 (stating that an ocean fertilization activity will not be given a
permit unless it constitutes legitimate scientific research).
290.
See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 88, art. VI (stating that the provisions of the
treaty cover the “area south of 60° South Latitude”).
291.
See id. arts. II–III (promoting, among other things, cooperation in scientific
investigation in Antarctica); Madrid Protocol, supra note 79, art. 3 (seeking to limit adverse
environmental impacts on Antarctica and acknowledging that the continent presents
opportunities for scientific discovery). Both the Antarctic Treaty and the Madrid Protocol
have been adopted by all countries with Antarctic activity. Id.
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Treaty system calls for both environmental protection and scientific
research.292 In particular, the brief Treaty establishes a “freedom of
scientific investigation,” within which Parties are to cooperate and share
information.293 It also calls for the Parties to meet to discuss and further the
facilitation of scientific research, as well as the “preservation and
conservation of living resources.”294 The Madrid Protocol is more detailed
about both environmental protection and scientific research.295 Generally
speaking, it promotes both, often simultaneously.296 For example, the
objective of the Parties is to protect the Antarctic environment and to
designate the area as “a natural reserve, devoted to peace and science.”297
Similarly, the agreement’s first principle is that both environmental
protection and Antarctica’s “value as an area for the conduct of scientific
research, in particular research essential to understanding the global
environment, shall be fundamental considerations in the planning and
conduct of all activities.”298 One principle states that “[a]ctivities shall be
planned and conducted so as to accord priority to scientific
research . . . including research essential to understanding the global
environment,”299 while the following principle states that activities shall be
“modified, suspended or cancelled if they result in or threaten to result in
impacts upon the Antarctic environment.”300
The Madrid Protocol and its Annexes impose obligations on its
Parties that could apply in the context of climate engineering field research.
All activities must be for peaceful purposes.301 Further, the climate
292.
See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 88, art. IX.1 (explaining that among the
objectives of the treaty are facilitation of scientific research and preservation of resources in
Antarctica). Interestingly, “scientific research” is left undefined.
293.
See id. arts. II (“Freedom of scientific investigation in Antartica and cooperation
toward that end . . . shall continue . . . .”).
294.
See id. art. IX.1 (stating that the Parties shall meet and consult with each other
regarding measures which can help to use Antarctica for peaceful purposes, to facilitate
scientific research, and to preserve living resources).
295.
See Madrid Protocol, supra note 80, art. 3 (describing the activities that must be
planned to limit adverse impacts to the Antarctic environment, giving a list of adverse
effects to avoid, and also explaining that the value of scientific research will be considered
and weighed based on a comprehensive list of factors).
296.
Notably, earlier drafts placed a greater emphasis on scientific research, with
environmental protection as a means to ensure that this goal remained possible. See W.M.
BUSH, ANTARCTICA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: A COLLECTION OF INTER-STATE AND
NATIONAL DOCUMENTS 5–7 (1991) (discussing prior drafts of the Antarctic Treaty).
297.
See Madrid Protocol, supra note 79, art. 2 (describing the treaty’s objective as
twofold: protecting the environment and devoting Antarctica to peace and science).
298.
Id. art. 3.1.
299.
Id. art. 3.2.
300.
Id. art. 3.4(b). “Adverse impacts” and “impacts” are not further defined.
301.
See id. art. 2 (“The Parties . . . hereby designate Antartica as a natural reserve,
devoted to peace and science.”).
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change/climate engineering tension is clear when the protocol states that,
“activities in the Antarctic Treaty area shall be planned and conducted so as
to limit adverse impacts on the Antarctic environment and . . . to avoid: (i)
adverse effects on climate or weather patterns; . . . [and] (iii) significant
changes in the atmospheric, terrestrial (including aquatic), glacial or marine
environments.”302 Both climate change and climate engineering will cause
“significant changes” in the atmosphere and environment.303 Moreover, the
former, and perhaps the latter, will cause “adverse effects” on the earth’s
climate.304 Climate engineering’s effects, however, and certainly those from
its research, are expected to be less severe.305 Additionally, climate
engineering is intended to avoid the adverse effects from climate change.306
Other relevant commitments include environmental impact assessment,
cooperation, monitoring, and reporting.307 Notably, scientific activities are
explicitly subject to impact assessment, and the only climate engineering
assessment, to date, supported ocean fertilization research.308
Two particular provisions in the Annexes could present barriers to
climate engineering research. First, if an activity “results in the significant
adverse modification of habitat,” it would require a permit from the state’s
“appropriate authority.”309 Second, ocean fertilization in Antarctic waters
could be considered “discharge into the sea of . . . any other chemical or
other substances, in quantities or concentrations that are harmful to the
marine environment,” and thus prohibited.310 The wording in both cases,
302.
Id. art. 3.2(b).
303.
See supra Parts I, II (outlining the consequences of climate change engineering).
304.
See supra Part II (describing climate engineering methods).
305.
See supra note 65 and accompanying text (comparing the relative impacts of
climate change and engineering).
306.
See supra Part II.
307.
See Madrid Protocol, supra note 79, arts. 3.2, 6, 8, 17 (imposing on the Parties
obligations to cooperate in the planning and conduct of activities in the Antarctic, to
complete environmental evaluations, to monitor environmental indicators, and to circulate
information to other Parties).
308.
See id. art. 6 (requiring environmental impact assessments); Karen N. Scott,
Scientific Rhetoric and Antarctic Security, in ANTARCTIC SECURITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 284 (Alan D. Hemmings et al. eds., 2012) (citing the assessed and approved
project by the New Zealand National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research).
Simultaneously, assessments of any activity “likely to have more than a minor or transitory
impact” must consider its effects on the conduct of scientific research. See Madrid Protocol,
supra note 79, Annex I, art. 3.2 (requiring this consideration).
309.
See Madrid Protocol, supra note 79, Annex II, arts. 1, 3 (defining “harmful
interference” to include significant adverse modification of habitats, and precluding
“harmful interference” except when allowed by permit). A permit is also required for
research activities in “Specially Protected or Managed Areas.” See id. Annex V, art. 4
(establishing when a Party seeking to conduct scientific research is required to have a
permit).
310.
Id. Annex IV, art. 4.
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however, requires that the environmental damage be certain and not merely
speculative.311 Field experiments, and particularly those of initially small
scales, would be unlikely, or at least uncertain, to have such effects.312 In
addition, ships operated by governments on a noncommercial basis are
exempt from the latter provision.313
J. Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the NorthEast Atlantic
The Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of
the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR Convention) is a regional marine MEA
that is important because of the governed regions’ proximity to, and the
participation of, countries that are leaders in climate engineering research,
such as the United Kingdom and Germany.314 The OSPAR Convention
regulates activities that may impact the environment of the northeast
Atlantic Ocean, including the North Sea and part of the Arctic Sea.315 Under
this convention, “pollution” is defined in much the same way as in the LCLP, the LRTAP Convention, and UNCLOS.316 Thus greenhouse gases and,
arguably, global warming are included in the definition of pollution. As a
consequence, the climate change/climate engineering tension is brought to
the fore by the OSPAR Convention’s most relevant provision, which
requires Parties to “take all possible steps to prevent and eliminate pollution
and shall take the necessary measures to protect the maritime area against
the adverse effects of human activities so as to safeguard human health and
to conserve marine ecosystems and, when practicable, restore marine areas
which have been adversely affected.”317 The final reference to restoration
311.
See id. at (defining “harmful interference” to include only particular activities and
only prohibiting the discharge of noxious substances as defined specifically in Annex II or
that are harmful to marine environment).
312.
See generally Parson & Keith, supra note 56, at 1279 (arguing that the
environmental impact of field experiments would be limited).
313.
See Madrid Protocol, supra note 79, Annex IV, art. 11 (stating that Annex IV of
the Protocol does not apply to ships owned or operated by a State and operated only for noncommercial service).
314.
See generally OSPAR Convention, supra note 75 (demonstrating that both
countries are signatories of the Convention); Parker & Keith, supra note 128 (discussing the
leaders of climate engineering research).
315.
See OSPAR Convention, supra note 75, art. I (explaining that “maritime area”
under the treaty generally includes the Atlantic and Arctic Ocean north of thirty-six degrees
north latitude).
316.
See id. (defining “pollution” to include introductions of substances or energy into
the maritime area that results in hazards to health, harm to the environment, or other
damage).
317.
Id. art. 2.1(a).

CLIMATE ENGINEERING FIELD RESEARCH

467

endorses the general concept of human interventions in the natural
environment in order to mitigate prior adverse effects.
A handful of other articles in the OSPAR Convention also shape its
relation to climate engineering field research. First, scientific research
(which remains undefined) is encouraged in order to “further the aims of
the Convention,” potentially lending some weight to climate engineering
experiments.318 Second, Parties are to apply both the precautionary
principle and the polluter pays principle.319 Although the former favors
climate engineering research in the context of the UNFCCC, this would not
be the case here, as it calls only for “preventive measures” in the face of
uncertain risks.320 Instead, this formulation of the precautionanry principle
would argue for proceeding with great caution—if at all—if a proposed
climate engineering field test were to pose a significant environmental
risk.321 In contrast, the polluter pays principle would support the research of
climate engineering because the work is presently funded by those States
that have contributed more to historical greenhouse gas emissions.322 Third,
in an article reminiscent of one in UNCLOS, Parties must carry out their
obligations in a manner that does not transfer pollution to the sea outside of
the covered area, or to another part of the environment.323 This would rule
out large-scale field research if early research indicated that further action
would protect the OSPAR area while polluting other areas. Fourth, in the
event of transboundary pollution, which could occur with climate
engineering field tests, Parties commit to consult one another in order to try
to reach an agreement, and either Party can seek the advice of the OSPAR
Convention’s governing Commission.324 Finally, Parties that are
responsible for climate engineering research would be subject to procedural
318.
See id. art. 8 (stating that the Parties must establish programs of scientific or
technical research and report the results of that research).
319.
See id. art. 2.2 (requiring the Parties to apply these principles in assessing state
conduct).
320.
See id. (“[P]reventive measures are to be taken when there are reasonable grounds
for concern that substances or energy introduced, directly or indirectly, into the marine
environment may bring about hazards to human health, harm living resources and marine
ecosystems, . . . even when there is no conclusive evidence of a causal relationship . . . .”).
321.
See Reynolds & Fleurke, supra note 132, at 104–05 (introducing and defining the
precautionary principle).
322.
See generally Parker & Keith, supra note 128 (documenting public funding of
climate engineering projects). Climate engineering research is presently led by Germany, the
United Kingdom, the European Union, and the United States, all of which are near the top of
historic greenhouse gas emissions. Id.
323.
See id. art. 2.4 (“The Contracting Parties shall apply the measures they adopt in
such a way as to prevent an increase in pollution of the sea outside the maritime area or in
other parts of the environment.”).
324.
See id. art. 21 (agreeing to enter into a consultation with any concerned state and
stating that any party may seek the advice of the Commission).
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obligations including environmental monitoring, reporting, and providing
public access to the relevant information.325
Ocean fertilization under the OSPAR Convention warrants some
final attention. Dumping, which is defined similarly to the definition in
UNCLOS and the LC-LP, is generally prohibited except in a handful of
circumstances.326 As witnessed under the LC-LP, whether ocean
fertilization and its research are dumping under this definition is unclear.327
Most OSPAR Convention Parties are also participants in the LC-LP (and in
the London Protocol specifically) and would likely defer to the detailed
rules of the latter.328 Furthermore, the Commission has passed a “Code of
Conduct for Responsible Marine Research,” which, although not binding,
dissuades scientists from changing populations or marine habitats.329
Regardless, this is not especially relevant, as the North Atlantic is less
suitable for ocean fertilization.330
K. Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary
Context
The Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a
Transboundary Context (the Espoo Convention)331 was developed through
the UNECE in order to clarify and expand States’ commitments to assess
potential transboundary environmental impacts, to share those assessments
with the public and other States, and to reduce significant environmental
transboundary effects.332 The Espoo Convention should improve
325.
See id. art. 6 (discussing environmental monitoring); id. art. 9 (discussing public
access to information); id. art. 22 (discussing reporting requirements).
326.
See id. arts. 1, 4, Annex II (defining and regulating dumping).
327.
See supra Part IV.H (discussing the LC-LP).
328.
Compare OSPAR Convention—Contracting Parties, OSPAR COMISSION,
http://www.ospar.org/content/content.asp?menu=01481200000026_000000_000000
(last
visited May 22, 2014) (listing the signatories to the Ospar Convention), with Office for the
London Convention and Protocol, supra note 261 (listing the signatories to the London
Convention and Protocol).
329.
See OSPAR Code of Conduct for Responsible Marine Research in the Deep Seas
and High Seas of the OSPAR Maritime Area, Annex 6, ¶¶ 12–13, 2008, OSPAR Doc,
08/24/1 (stating that responsible marine science includes a responsibility to avoid long-term
changes or any damage to species or habitats).
330.
See Williamson et al., supra note 33, at 477 (stating that the Southern Ocean is the
area with the greatest potential for ocean fertilization because iron is the limiting nutrient
there).
331.
Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context,
Feb. 25, 1991, 1989 U.N.T.S. 309 [hereinafter Espoo Convention].
332.
See generally id. (committing to “take all appropriate and effective measures to
prevent, reduce and control significant adverse transboundary environmental impact”). Most
industrialized nations, except for Russia and the United States, have joined the Espoo
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transparency, public participation, and international cooperation in the leadup to large-scale climate engineering field trials. Its definitions of “impact”
and “transboundary impact,” as well as its criteria for a significant proposed
activity, are each clearly broad enough to include large-scale climate
engineering field trials.333 Greenhouse gas emissions and climate change are
not be covered, however, as the agreement applies only to “proposed
activities” that are “subject to a decision of a competent authority in
accordance with an applicable national procedure.”334 Note that the Espoo
Convention only applies to potential transboundary environmental impacts
between two Parties to the Convention, and not to effects that are intrastate,
occur in nonstate areas, or occur in a non-party state.335
The Espoo Convention requires Parties to “take all appropriate and
effective measures to prevent, reduce and control significant adverse
transboundary environmental impact from proposed activities.”336 Thus, the
government of any Party that is considering approval of such a field trial
that may impact another Party would be subject to a number of procedural
obligations, most of which should be fulfilled before the activity is
approved.337 Chief among these is the duty to notify potentially affected
Parties and, if those countries agree, to undertake an environmental impact
assessment in such a manner as to permit participation by the public living
in the area likely to be affected, including the public of the other affected
countries.338 The origin Party and the concerned party are then required to
consult each other on the proposed project.339 When making the final
decision to approve the proposed activities, the origin Party is to take into
account the impact assessment, public comments, and the consultation with
the concerned Party.340 The Espoo Convention also calls for post-project
Convention. See Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary
Context Status, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION (May 4, 2014 7:04 PM),
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_
no=XXVII4&chapter=27&lang=en (providing a list of the signatories to the Espoo Convention) (on file
with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
333.
See id. art. 1 (defining “impact” and “transboundary”); see id. app. III (providing
criteria for activities not listed in Appendix 1 that potentially qualify as significant for
purposes of the agreement).
334.
Id. art. 1(v).
335.
See id. art. 1(viii) (noting that, under the Convention, “transboundary impact” is
limited to impact within the jurisdiction of a signatory).
336.
Id. art. 2.1.
337.
See id. art. 3 (explaining a Party’s obligation to notify other Parties of potential
environmental impacts).
338.
See id. art. 2 (detailing the procedures necessary for an impact assessment).
339.
See id. art. 5 (imposing requirements on consultation and impact assessment).
340.
See id. art. 6(1) (“The Parties shall ensure that, in the final decision . . . due
account is taken of the outcome of the environmental impact assessment, including
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analysis, and if there are “reasonable grounds for concluding that there is a
significant adverse transboundary impact . . . concerned Parties shall then
consult on necessary measures to reduce or eliminate the impact.”341
L. Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decisionmaking and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters
Like the Espoo Convention, the Convention on Access to
Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice
in Environmental Matters (the Aarhus Convention)342 is an MEA developed
within the UNECE in order to improve the disclosure of information and
access to decision-making for actions that may have an environmental
impact.343 It would commit Parties to carry out several procedural duties in
the event of large-scale climate engineering field tests.344 In general, “each
Party shall guarantee the rights of access to information, public
participation in decision-making, and access to justice in environmental
matters.”345 Notably, these matters need not be transboundary, and the
Espoo Convention consequently establishes these rights for individuals and
NGOs with respect to their own governments.346 Furthermore, these rights
apply even in the absence of present or potential harm.347 The Convention
details standards for the collection and provision of relevant information,
which is broadly defined.348 Although the original Aarhus Convention
the . . . documentation, as well as the comments thereon received . . . and the outcome of the
consultations . . . .”).
341.
Id. art. 7.
342.
Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making
and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, June 25, 1998, 2161 U.N.T.S. 447
[hereinafter Aarhus Convention].
343.
See generally id. (recognizing that public access to information is important for
environmental protection). The UNECE countries that are not a party to the Aarhus
convention include the United States, Canada, and Russia. See Convention on Access to
Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in
Environmental Matters Status, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION (May 4, 2014 6:57
PM), https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no= XXVII13&chapter=27&lang=en (providing a list of the signatories to the Aarhus Convention) (on
file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
344.
See generally Aarhus Convention supra note 342 (establishing requirements on
signatories prior to taking actions that may affect the environment).
345.
Id. art. 1.
346.
See id. pmbl. (“Recognizing further the importance of the respective roles that
individual citizens, non-governmental organizations and the private sector can play in
environmental protection.”).
347.
See id. arts. 3–5 (listing the obligations of parties under the Aarhus Convention).
348.
See id. art. 2.3 (defining “environmental information” to include “activities or
measures, including administrative measures, environmental agreements, policies,
legislation, plans and programmes, affecting or likely to affect the elements of the
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obligates Parties to merely “encourage [private] operators whose activities
have a significant impact on the environment to inform the public regularly
of the environmental impact of their activities and products,”349 its Kiev
Protocol on Pollutant Release and Transfer Registers expands this into an
obligation for private actors to collect and publish relevant data.350 The
right for participation is somewhat similar to the process of environmental
impact assessment in the Espoo Convention,351 and is limited to those
members of the broad “public concerned.”352 The provision in the Aarhus
Convention for access to justice establishes minimum standards of redress
for members of the public with sufficient interests in any environmental
laws that have been violated.353
V. Nonbinding Multilateral Environmental Agreements
This section analyzes four nonbinding international agreements that
may shape how climate engineering research will be regulated. Although
nonbinding, they constitute a key component of international soft law and
provide a sense of where the international community stands.
A. Provisions for Co-operation Between States in Weather Modification
In 1980, partially in response to the passage of ENMOD, the
leadership of the UN Environmental Programme (UNEP) drafted and
environment . . . , and cost-benefit and other economic analyses and assumptions used in
environmental decision-making”); id. arts. 4–5 (explaining the procedure for collecting
environmental information and detailing the required access to, and dissemination of, such
information).
349.
Id. art. 5.6.
350.
See Protocol on Pollutant Release and Transfer Registers to the Convention on
Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in
Environmental Matters, May 21, 2003, 005/2010 U.K.T.S. Cm. 7879 (mandating that each
operator impacting the environment regularly inform the public of the environmental impact
and any voluntary auditing schemes).
351.
Compare Aarhus Convention, supra note 342, art. 6.7 (“Procedures for public
participation shall allow the public to submit, in writing or, as appropriate, at a public
hearing or inquiry with the applicant, any comments, information, analyses or opinions that
it considers relevant to the proposed activity.”), with Espoo Convention, supra note 331, art.
2.2 (providing for public participation).
352.
See Aarhus Convention, supra note 342, art. 2.5v (“‘The public concerned’ means
the public affected or likely to be affected by, or having an interest in, the environmental
decision-making; for the purposes of this definition, non-governmental organizations
promoting environmental protection and meeting any requirements under national law shall
be deemed to have an interest.”).
353.
See id. art. 9 (establishing that a Party seeking redress must either have a
“sufficient interest” or maintain that a right has been impaired).
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approved Provisions for Co-operation between States in Weather
Modification.354 Although weather and climate are scientifically distinct,
the Provisions define “weather modification” to include climate
interventions, and this is thus a particularly important nonbinding legal
document.355 In general, the document provides qualified support for
weather modification while calling for procedural duties to be imposed on
the States under whose authority these activities may take place. For
example, it notes “the possible benefits which weather modification may
hold for mankind and the environment”356 and asserts that “[w]eather
modification should be dedicated to the benefit of mankind and the
environment.”357 The Provisions further call for “[e]xchange of information,
notification, consultation and other forms of co-operation.”358 For potential
transboundary impacts from weather modification, this provision
recommends environmental impact assessments and efforts “to ensure that
[weather modification activities] do not cause damage to the environment
of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.”359
B. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment
Modern international environmental law can be traced to the 1972
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment and its Declaration
(the Stockholm Declaration).360 To the extent that it still conveys the
priorities of contemporary international environmental law, it lends support
to climate engineering field research, provided that such activity is done in
a manner that minimizes transboundary harm.361 The Stockholm
Declaration is a thoroughly anthropocentric document, emphasizing
354.
See generally Provisions for Co-operation between States in Weather
Modification, U.N.E.P. Dec. 8/7/A, U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC/8/7/A (Apr. 29, 1980) (setting out
States’ obligations to each other with respect to weather modification).
355.
See id. pt. 1(b) (“[A]ny action performed with the intention of producing artificial
changes in the properties of the atmosphere for purposes such as increasing, decreasing or
redistributing precipitation or cloud coverage, moderating severe storms and tropical
cyclones, decreasing or suppressing hail or lightning or dissipating fog.”).
356.
Id. cl. 5.
357.
Id. pt. 1(a).
358.
See id. pt. 1(b) (explaining that these further provisions should be carried out in
good faith and without delay).
359.
Id. pt. 1(f).
360.
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
adopted June 16, 1972, 11 I.L.M. 1416 [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration].
361.
See id. ¶¶ 6–7 (stating that “through fuller knowledge and wiser action, we can
achieve for ourselves and our posterity . . . an environment more in keeping with human
needs” but that to “achieve this environmental goal will demand the acceptance of
responsibility . . . at every level, all sharing equitably in common efforts”).
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humans’ responsibility to “manage” the “human environment” in order to
“protect and improve” it.362 For example, it proclaims that “man [sic] must
use knowledge to build, in collaboration with nature, a better
environment.”363 Additionally, its first principle is that “he [sic] bears a
solemn responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present
and future generations.”364 The focus on “human environment” further
implies a prioritization of the environment as it relates to the well being of
people, and that preservation of the natural environment for its own sake is
secondary.365 Furthermore, the Stockholm Declaration calls for science and
technology to be “applied to the identification, avoidance and control of
environmental risks and the solution of environmental problems and for the
common good of mankind”366 and for “the free flow of up-to-date scientific
information and transfer of experience.”367 It also explicates principles for
the minimization and reduction of transboundary harm,368 for the
development of liability for transboundary harm,369 and for international
cooperation in protecting and improving the environment.370
C. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development
Twenty years later, representatives of most countries agreed upon
the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (Rio Declaration).371
Although it retains a somewhat anthropocentric focus, almost entirely
absent are the calls to manage and improve the Earth.372 Instead, it focuses
362.
See generally id. (outlining the “special responsibility to safeguard and wisely
manage the heritage of wildlife and its habitat”).
363.
Id. ¶ 6.
364.
Id. princ. 1.
365.
See Dinah Shelton, Human Rights, Environmental Rights, and the Right to
Environment, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 103, 108 (1991) (“The 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the
Human Environment suggests that human benefit is the primary reason for respecting the
environment . . . .”).
366.
Stockholm Declaration, supra note 360, princ. 18.
367.
Id. princ. 20.
368.
See id. princ. 21 (“States have . . . the responsibility to ensure that activities within
their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.”).
369.
See id. princ. 22 (“States shall cooperate to develop further the international law
regarding liability and compensation for the victims of pollution and other environmental
damage caused by activities within the jurisdiction or control of such States to areas beyond
their jurisdiction.”).
370.
See id. princ. 24 (stating that international efforts to protect and improve the
environment “should be handled in a cooperative spirit by all countries”).
371.
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, adopted June 14, 1992, 31
I.L.M. 874 [hereinafter Rio Declaration].
372.
See id. at princ. 1 (“Human beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable
development . . . .”).
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on the interrelation between environmental protection and the needs of the
world’s poor.373 Some of the principles of the Rio Declaration, however,
could be interpreted as favoring climate engineering research. For example,
it calls for “improving scientific understanding” and for developing “new
and innovative technologies.”374 Furthermore, because the research would
largely be financed by industrialized countries, the Rio Declaration’s
discussion of “common but differentiated responsibilities” and of the
“internalization of environmental costs” appear supportive of climate
engineering research.375 The Rio Declaration also invokes precaution:
“[w]here there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing costeffective measures to prevent environmental degradation.”376 Given that the
threats of climate change appear to be more serious and irreversible than
those of climate engineering,377 and that the latter is expected to have low
financial costs,378 the Rio Declaration—like the UNFCCC—appears to
argue for climate engineering research.379 On the other hand, another
principle states that countries should “discourage or prevent the relocation
and transfer to other States of any activities and substances that cause
severe environmental degradation or are found to be harmful to human
health.”380 If field trials were to somehow put one human population at
particular risk, this Principle may be violated.381 Finally, some of the
principles call for procedural obligations on the part of countries that may
approve climate engineering field trials.382 Perhaps most importantly, such
373.
See id. princ. 6 (stating that those countries “least developed and those most
environmentally vulnerable” are to be “given special priority”).
374.
See id. princ. 9 (“States should cooperate to . . . improv[e] scientific understanding
through exchanges of scientific and technological knowledge, and . . . enhance[e] the
development, adaptation, diffusion and transfer of technologies, including new and
innovative technologies.”).
375.
See id. princ. 7 (“States have common but differentiated responsibilities.”); id. at
princ. 16 (“National authorities should endeavour to promote the internalization of
environmental costs.”).
376.
Id. princ. 15.
377.
See supra note 65 (comparing the effects of climate change with the more limited
effects of climate engineering).
378.
See supra note 121 and accompanying text (discussing the relative low cost of
climate engineering).
379.
See supra notes 130–132 and accompanying text (discussing the UNFCCC’s
support for cost-effective climate engineering research).
380.
Rio Declaration, supra note 371, at princ. 14.
381.
See id. princ. 14 (“States should effectively cooperate to discourage or prevent the
relocation and transfer to other States of any activities and substances that cause severe
environmental degradation or are found to be harmful to human health.”).
382.
See id. princ. 17 (requiring States to prepare environmental impact assessments);
id. princ. 19 (“States shall provide prior and timely notification and relevant information to
potentially affected states . . . .”).
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steps “should, as far as possible, be based on an international consensus.”383
The governments of these countries should also conduct environmental
impact assessments,384 notify affected States,385 and provide public access
to relevant information.386
D. UN General Assembly
Finally, the UN General Assembly approved a 2007 resolution that,
among other things, “encourages States to support the further study and
enhance understanding of ocean iron fertilization.”387
VI. Customary International Law
Customary international law concerning transboundary harm will
also apply to climate engineering field research. The customary law
examined here has been discussed above, where it is embodied in various
MEAs.
A. Prevention
The customary international law of preventing potential
transboundary environmental impacts is among the oldest and mostestablished components of international environmental law. 388 States’
commitments in this regard are to “prevent, reduce, and control
transboundary pollution and environmental harm resulting from activities
within their jurisdiction or control . . . [and] to cooperate in mitigating
transboundary environmental risks and emergencies, th[r]ough notification,
consultation, negotiation, and in appropriate cases, environmental impact
assessment.”389 Such customary law has developed through court cases and

383.
Id. princ. 12.
384.
See id. princ. 17 (calling on States to make environmental impact assessments
when their activities “are likely to have a significant adverse impact on the
environment . . . .”).
385.
See id. princ. 19 (listing the instances that States need to notify one another of
potential environmental impacts).
386.
See id. princ. 10 (“States shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and
participation by making information widely available.”).
387.
G.A. Res. 62/215, ¶ 98, U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/215 (Dec. 22, 2007).
388.
See DANIEL BODANSKY, THE ART AND CRAFT OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 198 (2010) (noting that the “duty to prevent transboundary pollution” is seen as the
“most firmly established customary norm” of international environmental law).
389.
BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 68, at 137.
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state practice.390 Using the International Law Commission (ILC) Draft
Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous
Activities391 as a guide, some forms of large-scale climate engineering field
research could pose a “significant risk of causing significant transboundary
harm.”392 Although not defined in the articles, the accompanying
commentary clarifies this phrase as being objectively and reasonably
foreseeable, with the potential harm as being “more than detectable but
need not be at the level of ‘serious’ or ‘substantial.’ The harm must lead to
a real detrimental effect on matters such as, for example, human health,
industry, property, environment or agriculture in other states.”393 If climate
engineering field research were to be undertaken, then the origin State’s
duties would include implementing “all appropriate measures to prevent”
the harm,394 requiring authorization for a domestic party to conduct the
activity in question,395 performing an environmental impact assessment,396
notifying States likely to be affected,397 informing the public likely to be
affected,398 and developing contingency plans to prepare for an
emergency.399 The precise steps to prevent and minimize the harm are
subject to consultations between the countries,400 and are to be “based on an
equitable balance of interests,”401 whose relevant factors for consideration
include:

390.
See id. at 138 (explaining that the duty to prevent potential transboundary harm is
evidenced by treaties, state action, and case law).
391.
53 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10, art. 2(a), UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in
[2001] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 146 U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2)
[hereinafter Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm].
392.
See id. art. 1 (“Any activity which involves the risk of causing significant
transboundary harm through the physical consequences is within the scope of the articles.”);
id. art. 1 cmt. 14 (“The mere fact that harm eventually results from an activity does not mean
that the activity involved a risk, if no properly informed observer was or could have been
aware of that risk at the time the activity was carried out.”).
393.
Id. art. 2 cmt. 4.
394.
See id. art. 3 (“The State of origin shall take all appropriate measures to prevent
significant transboundary harm or at any event to minimize the risk thereof.”).
395.
See id. art. 6 (listing the circumstances under which a State may require prior
authorization before a party can act).
396.
See id. art. 7 (requiring States to consider any environmental impact assessment
when authorizing certain activities).
397.
See id. art. 8 (requiring States to notify other States likely to be affected if the
assessment required in art. 7 “indicates a risk of causing significant transboundary harm”).
398.
See id. art. 13 (requiring States to inform the public likely to be affected).
399.
See id. art. 16 (“The State of origin shall develop contingency plans for responding
to emergencies.”).
400.
See id. art. 9 ¶ 1 (stating that “[t]he states concerned shall enter into
consultations”).
401.
Id. art. 9 ¶ 2.
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the importance of the activity, taking into account its
overall advantages of a social, economic and technical
character for the State of origin in relation to the potential
harm for the State likely to be affected; . . . [and] the
economic viability of the activity in relation to the costs of
prevention and to the possibility of carrying out the activity
elsewhere or by other means or replacing it with an
alternative activity . . . .402
These two phrases again pose the climate change/climate engineering
tension. The “equitable balance of interests” creates a significant burden for
the potentially affected country to argue for strong preventative measures,
particularly if the state of origin were to face high climate change damages
and high costs to mitigate these damages.403 An alternate interpretation of
these factors, however, could be that climate engineering field research
does not present concentrated economic benefits to the country performing
it.404 Instead, its benefits would be diffused throughout the world, whereas
the risks may be limited to a small number of countries.405 Ultimately, how
a court may rule would depend on the particular context406 and the extent to
which the state of risk origin had acted with due diligence.407
The second half of the customary law of prevention is for countries
to cooperate to mitigate risks.408 Specific duties herein include notification,
consultation, and negotiation.409 For example, according to the Rio
Declaration, the notification should be “prior and timely” and consist of
“relevant information.”410 Consultations should occur “at an early stage and

402.
Id. art. 10(b), (e).
403.
See supra note 121 and accompanying text (discussing the costs of SRM climate
engineering research).
404.
See id. at 103 (discussing the potential benefits of SRM climate engineering
research).
405.
See id. at 103–04 (arguing that deploying SRM has a “reasonable chance” of
“significantly reduc[ing] the net damage from climate change to humans and the
environment,” and its smaller costs would be considered insurance).
406.
See Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm, supra note 392, art. 10
(stating factors to consider in the “equitable balance of interests” required in article 9).
407.
See id. art. 3 cmts. 7–8 (defining due diligence and explaining its prevalence in the
“protection of the environment from harm”).
408.
See BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 68, at 137 (listing theStates that have a duty to
“cooperate in mitigating transboundary environmental risks and emergencies”).
409.
See id. (requiring States to mitigate risks through “notification, consultation,
negotiation, and in appropriate cases, environmental impact assessment”).
410.
See Rio Declaration, supra note 371, princ. 19 (describing requirements of notice
and consultation).
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in good faith.”411 Most States under whose jurisdiction or control climate
engineering field trials would occur would require an environmental impact
assessment under domestic law, even in the absence of transboundary
risks.412 If they were to occur in areas beyond national jurisdiction, then
MEAs including UNCLOS and the Antarctica Treaty system would
apply.413 If the proposal raised the prospect of transboundary impacts, then
the Espoo Convention, customary international law, and many national
laws would call for assessments.414 Regardless, the details of impact
assessments are often more contentious than whether an assessment is
required.415 In a domain as novel as climate engineering field
experimentation, uncertainty may prevail, and both a judicious
interpretation of the precautionary principle as well as political wisdom
calls for erring on the side of a more thorough assessment.416 There are,
however, limited exceptions, as not every country has an assessment law or
is a party to the Espoo Convention.417 Furthermore, customary law, which
requires assessment, does not apply to effects completely within national
boundaries or to global impacts.418
B. Responsibility and Liability
The international law on ex post responsibility and liability for
transboundary damage remains less developed than the law regarding its
411.
See id. (discussing the obligations between nations when conducting experiments
that affect the environment).
412.
See BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 68, at 165 (“An [environmental impact assessment]
is fundamental to any regulatory system which seeks to identify environmental risk,
integrate environmental concerns into development projects and promote sustainable
development.”).
413.
See SANDS & PEEL, supra note 74, at 605–08 (discussing when an environmental
assessment is required under a variety of international treaties covering the environment).
414.
See id. at 605, 611 (discussing the use of environmental impact assessments in the
context of customary law and the Espoo Convention).
415.
See id. at 602 (noting that while it is generally understood when environmental
impact assessments need to be made, there is much less consensus as to what should be
included in the assessments).
416.
See BETZ AT AL., supra note 240, at 99 (suggesting that environmental impact
assessments should be more thorough for climate engineering because there is a greater risk
of hazard with climate engineering) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF
ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
417.
See SANDS & PEEL, supra note 74, at 601 (noting that environmental impact
assessments “have been progressively adopted in a very large number of legal systems,”
suggesting that not all legal systems require assessments); id. at 610 (noting that the Espoo
Convention only commits Parties who signed the Convention).
418.
See BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 68, at 167 (“[A]t present general international law
neither requires states to assess possible global effects for effects wholly within their own
borders.”).
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prevention.419 For example, the only MEAs examined here that establish
liability are the Space Liability Convention420 and UNCLOS.421 Under
customary international law, if the state that is the source of damage
violated international law, including noncompliance with the customary
international law of preventing transboundary harm, it should cease the
activity, assure that the act will not recur, and make reparations for the
injuries.422 In the absence of a violation, climate engineering field studies—
certainly at larger scales—likely qualify as ultra-hazardous activities,423 for
which there is often absolute or strict liability.424 Although, such absolute or
strict liability could, in theory, be considered a part of customary
international law due to its presence in national and international laws and
for a handful of specific activities, there is not yet adequate state practice
for this to be the case.425 The draft ILC principles for Transboundary

419.
See id. at 303 (acknowledging an “absence of clarity concerning remedies
available to states and their scope”).
420.
See Space Liability Convention, supra note 217 and accompanying text.
421.
See UNCLOS supra note 247 and accompanying text. An Annex to the Madrid
Protocol for liability in the Antarctic is not yet in force. See The Protocol on Environmental
Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, SECRETARIAT OF THE ANTARCTIC TREATY,
http://www.ats.aq/e/ep.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2014) (“Annex VI on Liability Arising from
Environmental Emergencies was adopted by the 28th ATCM in Stockholm in 2005 and will
enter into force once approved by all Consultative Parties.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON
AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
422.
See Factory at Chorzów (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 47 (Sept.
13,
1928),
available
at
http://www.icj-cij.org
/pcij/serie_A/A_17/54_Usine_de_Chorzow_Fond_Arret.pdf (highlighting that reparations
should attempt to “wipe out all of the consequences of the illegal act”); Draft Articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 53 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10, art.
1–2, 30–31, 34–39, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n
26 U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2) (explaining a State’s liability when it
violates international law); see also id. art. 24–25 (providing the possibility that a state that
is seriously threatened by climate change may defend a violation of international law based
upon necessity or even distress).
423.
See Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm, supra note 392, art. 1,
cmt. ¶ 2 (“An ultra-hazardous activity is perceived to be an activity with a danger that is
rarely expected to materialize but might assume, on that rare occasion, grave (more than
signiﬁcant, serious or substantial) proportions.”).
424.
See SANDS & PEEL, supra note 74, at 712 (“Strict liability for ultrahazardous
activities might be considered a general principle of law . . . .”).
425.
See id. (explaining that while “[s]trict liability for ultrahazardous activities might
be considered a general principle of law . . . .” and some treaties include strict liability, the
current overall landscape of international law does not support strict liability as customary
law). Nuclear energy, space activities, maritime transportation of oil, and the transportation
and disposal of hazardous waste share strict or absolute, limited liability. See C. WILFRED
JENKS, LIABILITY FOR ULTRA-HAZARDOUS ACTIVITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 160–67 (1967)
(discussing when liability may exist for climate modification).
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Damage due to Hazardous Activities,426 however, call for States to “ensure
that prompt and adequate compensation is available for victims” and to
impose strict liability on the operators of the activity.427 In the case of
climate engineering and its research, demonstrating causation would be
particularly daunting.428
VII. Conclusions and Lingering Issues
Existing international environmental law provides both a regulatory
and normative framework that will influence climate engineering field
research and its regulation, and is, on the whole, favorable toward this
research. Throughout these considerations, the climate change/climate
engineering tension looms, and how a particular proposed climate
engineering field experiment would fare under international environmental
law is to a great degree contingent upon the assessments of the risks of
climate change, and of both the risks and potential benefits of the field test
in question. It is important to emphasize that this favorable setting does not
necessarily extend to the deployment of large-scale climate engineering
projects. Of course, almost none of this law was developed with climate
engineering in mind and it consequently forms an inconsistent, sometimes
contradictory legal environment. Furthermore, drawing general conclusions
is difficult, as the actual rights and obligations of States will depend on
numerous factors such as the form of climate engineering being researched,
its scale, its location, and the likelihood, magnitude, and location of
potential transboundary effects. Nevertheless, a handful of specific
conclusions exist.
There are five reasons for the generally positive international legal
environment of climate engineering research. First, to the extent that the
426.
Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm
Arising out of Hazardous Activities, 58 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 10, at princ. 4, U.N. Doc.
A/61/10
(2006),
available
at
legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft
articles/9_10_2006.pdf.
427.
See generally id. (establishing strict liability for operators who partake in
hazardous activities that cause transboundary harm).
428.
See Toby Svoboda & Peter J. Irvine, Ethical and Technical Challenges in
Compensating for Harm Due to Solar Radiation Management Geoengineering, 17 ETHICS,
POL’Y & ENV’T (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 11) (“The uncertainty involved in
attributing particular changes in climate to specific causes could make it very difficult to
determine whether some harmful impact, such as a prolonged drought, is due to a deployed
SRM technique or not.”); but see Joshua B. Horton et al., Liability for Solar
Geoengineering: Historical Precedents, Contemporary Innovations, and Governance
Possibilities, 22 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 26) (arguing that
“the problem of attribution does not necessarily appear to present an insurmountable barrier
to crafting a workable regime”).
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MEAs reviewed here seek to protect the environment, they favor, at the
least, research into climate engineering as a potential means to reduce risks
to humans and the environment from climate change. International
environmental law has a generally anthropocentric orientation, and that is
evident throughout these MEAs. While climate engineering field research
may present some threat to the natural environment, climate change is
forecast to pose substantially more significant risks.429 Furthermore, in
several cases, greenhouse gases and/or climate change appear to satisfy the
criteria for the pollution, damage, or adverse effects which the MEAs seek
to reduce.430 Therefore, to the extent that a balancing is suggested by these
MEAs’ commitments from States to reduce such pollution or damage and
to protect the environment more generally, they channel and tilt favorably
toward climate engineering research as a means to develop a potential
additional response to climate change—even if it presents risks of its
own.431 At the same time, if a line of climate engineering research were to
hold little potential to reduce climate change risks while presenting large
risks of its own, then this balance would shift against the research.
Second, many of the agreements explicitly or implicitly encourage
scientific research and technological development.432
Third, the development of climate engineering is also consistent
with some principles of international environmental law, including common
but differentiated responsibility, polluter pays, and—in some of its forms—
the precautionary principle, which are invoked at various times by the
agreements.433
Fourth, in several cases, climate engineering research is supported
due to its projected high speed and low financial cost.434
429.
See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
430.
See supra notes 71–75 and accompanying text.
431.
See supra notes 60‒62 and accompanying text.
432.
See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 118 and accompanying text; UNFCCC, supra
notes 125–26 and accompanying text; Vienna Convention, supra notes 170, 176 and
accompanying text; ENMOD, supra notes 146–47 and accompanying text; LRTAP
Convention, supra note 183 and accompanying text; Oslo Protocol, supra note 198 and
accompanying text; Outer Space Treaty, supra note 210 and accompanying text; UNCLOS,
supra notes 241–44 and accompanying text; Antarctica Treaty, supra notes 293, 297–99 and
accompanying text; OSPAR Convention, supra note 318 and accompanying text; Stockholm
Declaration, supra note 367 and accompanying text; Rio Declaration, supra note 374 and
accompanying text.
433.
See UNFCCC, supra notes 127–32 and accompanying text; Oslo Protocol, supra
note 187 and accompanying text; OSPAR Convention, supra note 319 and accompanying
text; Rio Declaration, supra notes 375–76 and accompanying text; see also Reynolds &
Fleurke, supra note 132 and accompanying text.
434.
See UNFCCC, supra notes 121–24 and accompanying text; LRTAP Convention,
supra notes 185–87 and accompanying text.
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Fifth and finally, all three agreements whose subject matter are
most relevant to climate engineering favor climate engineering field
research.435 The UNFCCC calls for the avoidance of dangerous climate
change for humanity’s sake,436 for the use of methods that are rapid and
inexpensive,437 for industrialized countries to shoulder the financial
burden,438 for precautionary action to mitigate the negative effects of
climate change,439 for the promotion of applicable scientific and
technological research,440 and for States to enhance reservoirs and sinks of
greenhouse gases.441 ENMOD and the UNEP Provisions for Weather
Modification each encourage the development of peaceful climate
engineering, in part to improve the environment for the sake of the human
population.442
Despite being supportive of climate engineering research in
general, existing law imposes duties on the part of the States that would be
responsible for field research. For the most part, these are the procedural
duties regarding the prevention and mitigation of transboundary harm, such
as notification, assessment, consultation, and negotiation.443 These are part
of customary international law, and the MEAs provide further explicit
detail for some situations, including that of risks to the environment in areas
outside of state territory. The Espoo Convention adds public participation in
the assessment and post-project analysis,444 and the Aarhus Convention
requires access to information and public participation in decision-making,
even for projects that would have wholly domestic effects.445
Moreover, some of the binding MEAs impose particular constraints
and prohibitions on parties to these agreements. Among these, the most
general and most challenging to interpret is the statement of the CBD COP.
435.
See supra Part IV.A, IV.B, IV.C.
436.
See supra notes 111–13 and accompanying text.
437.
See supra notes 121–24 and accompanying text.
438.
See supra notes 127–29 and accompanying text.
439.
See supra notes 130–32 and accompanying text.
440.
See supra notes 125–26 and accompanying text; see also Kyoto Protocol, supra
note 118 and accompanying text.
441.
See supra notes 115–18 and accompanying text.
442.
See ENMOD, supra notes 143–47, and accompanying text; UNEP Provisions for
Weather Modification, supra notes 356–58 and accompanying text.
443.
See UNFCCC supra note 133 and accompanying text; CBD, supra note, 159 and
accompanying text; LRTAP Convention, supra note 205 and accompanying text; Outer
Space Treaty, supra note 214 and accompanying text; Madrid Protocol, supra notes 307–08
and accompanying text; OSPAR Convention, supra notes 324–25 and accompanying text;
Stockholm Declaration, supra note 370 and accompanying text; Rio Declaration, supra note
384–86 and accompanying text; Weather Modification Provisions, supra notes 358–59 and
accompanying text.
444.
See supra note 332–41 and accompanying text.
445.
See supra notes 343–53 and accompanying text.
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While nonbinding, this statement indicates that the international community
desires a greater degree of regulation, consideration of risks, and scientific
justification before large-scale field research is undertaken.446 In contrast,
the the LC-LP framework for ocean fertilization and the more general
London Protocal framework for marine geoengineering provide the clearest
regulation, prohibiting it unless a project is deemed to be legitimate
scientific research.447 Another strong restriction on climate engineering
research is the apparent prohibition on sulfur-based SAI SRM field tests
within the territory of the Parties to the Gothenburg Protocol to the LRTAP
Convention.448 Throughout the world, climate engineering investigations
must be non-hostile if they have “widespread, long-lasting or severe
effects” and if conducted at sea and in Antarctica, they must be for peaceful
purposes.449 At sea, research must not undermine the protection of marine
environment, cannot unjustifiably interfere with other legitimate uses of the
sea, must use appropriate scientific methods and means, and is subject to
the authority of coastal States in their territory, exclusive economic zones,
and continental shelves. Furthermore, marine climate engineering work
cannot merely transfer or transform pollution, although these provisions
may apply only to climate engineering deployment. In the northeast
Atlantic Ocean, if there are reasonable grounds that climate engineering
research may present a hazard to human health or the environment, then the
state is obligated to take “preventative measures.”450 In the Antarctic Treaty
area, a permit may be needed in certain locations, and research projects
must be cancelled if they threaten to harm the environment.451 States would
be liable for damage caused by climate engineering research in space or if
they violate international law (although demonstrating causation will be
difficult).452 In theory, the sulfur-based SAI SRM field tests could be
prohibited under the Montreal Protocol, if they were found to be
significantly destructive to the ozone layer and if the Parties actually take
novel action.453
446.
See supra notes 159–62 and accompanying text.
447.
See supra notes 263–89 and accompanying text.
448.
See supra notes 190–93 and accompanying text; see also Oslo Protocol, supra
note 206 (noting that large-scale sulfur SAI SRM tests are not permitted under the
Gothenburg and Oslo Protocol).
449.
See ENMOD, supra notes 144–45 and accompanying text; UNCLOS, supra note,
245 and accompanying text; Madrid Protocol, supra note 301 and accompanying text; see
also Outer Space Treaty, supra note 208, art. III (noting that, in space, activities must merely
be “in the interest of maintaining international peace and security”).
450.
See supra notes 319–20 and accompanying text.
451.
See supra notes 300, 309 and accompanying text.
452.
See Outer Space Treaty and Space Liability Convention, supra notes 217–21 and
accompanying text; UNCLOS, supra note 247; customary international law supra Part VI.B.
453.
See supra notes 163–72 and accompanying text.
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Finally, any law governing climate engineering research, whether it
relies upon existing MEAs or otherwise, will be complicated by a
determination of what qualifies as climate engineering research. Thus far,
definitions have been employed that typically rely on the intention of the
researcher or the effects of the research.454 Intentions, however, are easily
denied, and the precise effects of field research may remain partially
unknown until after they are carried out.455 Other important questions arise.
In terms of scale, at what point does a small-scale project warrant the
attention of domestic or international law, and at what point does a largescale project become deployment?456 How is research that investigates basic
environmental processes or climate change (or at least claims to do so), yet
could also be used to develop climate engineering potentially affected? But,
determining how to define “climate engineering research” and its thresholds
will likely be the most challenging aspect in the development of its
regulation.
Despite these duties and limited restrictions, extant international
environmental law remains on the whole favorable to responsibly
conducted climate engineering field research, particularly due to its
potential to reduce harm to humans and the environment. Although
international law does influence state behavior, state interests and global
and domestic politics arguably play larger roles in shaping the actions of
decision makers.457 How a potentially controversial, risky, large scale
climate engineering field test is perceived by the international community
depends not only on existing international environmental law but also on
international and domestic political circumstances, the severity of current
and forecast climate change, the reputations and nationalities of the
454.
See supra notes 143, 159, 264, 279, 355 and accompanying text. It is important to
note that the definition of “marine geoengineering” used in the amendment to the London
Protocol requires only a “deliberate intervention in the marine environment to manipulate
natural processes.”
455.
See Kelsi BRACMORT & RICHARD K. LATTANZIO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41371,
GEOENGINEERING: GOVERNANCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY 1 (2013) (discussing how some
observers “respond that the uncertainties of geoengineering may only be resolved through
further scientific and technical examination”).
456.
See Parson & Keith, supra note 56, at 1278 (suggesting thresholds for defining
categories of climate engineering research).
457.
See generally Steinberg, supra note 105 (surveying the neorealist approach to
international law and international relations); Barbara Koremenos, Institutionalism and
International Law, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART 59 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A.
Pollack, eds., 2013) (surveying the institutionalist approach to international law and
international relations); see also Victor, supra note 47, at 322 (arguing that treaties “are
unlikely to be effective in constraining geoengineers because the interests of key players
diverge and it is relatively easy for countries to avoid inconvenient international
commitments and act unilaterally”).
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scientists, the evidence from prior modeling and laboratory experiments,
the nature of the field experiment, and the robustness of domestic
regulation. In the worst case scenario, it could become a source of
significant international tension.
Another unfortunate scenario would be the unduly restrictive
regulation of climate engineering and its research, developed in haste and
based upon fears and assumptions of potential risks, without balancing such
risks with climate engineering’s potential to reduce the risks from climate
change. The result would likely be significant net harm to humans and the
environment. Considering that we, as an international community, still do
not know exactly what climate engineering is, what risks its field research
poses, and what we do and do not want from it, a preferred path would be
the gradual emergence of norms and rules via a mixture of
intergovernmental institutions and transnational communities of scientists,
civil society, and other experts.458 Fortunately, this appears to be
unfolding.459 Here, many of the bodies established by international
environmental law will be particularly important.
458.
See Victor, supra note 47, at 332 (“A more effective approach to building a
relevant regulatory system would concentrate, today, on laying the groundwork for future
negotiations over norms rather than attempting to codify immature norms now . . . build[ing]
norms from the ‘bottom up.’”); see also William Daniel Davis, What Does “Green” Mean?:
Anthropogenic Climate Change, Geoengineering, and International Environmental Law, 43
GA. L. REV. 901, 907 (2009) (“An internationally collaborative research program, moreover,
could begin to develop international behavioral norms that would reduce the risks associated
with geoengineering.”); David Victor et al., The Geoengineering Option: A Last Resort
Against Global Warming?, 88 FOREIGN AFF. 64, 66 (2009) (“Governments should
immediately begin to undertake serious research on geoengineering and help create
international norms governing its use. . . . Scientists could be influential in creating these
norms.”); David Keith et al., supra note 53, at 427 (“A better approach would be to build
international cooperation and norms from the bottom up, as knowledge and experience
develop.”); Lisa Dilling & Rachel Hauser, Governing Geoengineering Research: Why, When
and How?, 121 CLIMATIC CHANGE 553, 563 (2013) (“Over time, researchers and
stakeholders could meet to assess progress in governance, identify emerging norms, and
correct problems. Governance norms could spread through the sharing of ‘best practices,’
and the gradual institutionalization of successful ones.”); M. Granger Morgan et al., Needed:
Research Guidelines for Solar Radiation Management, 29 ISSUES SCI. & TECH. 37, 41 (2013)
(“[T]here is a pressing need to develop what we will call a code of best SRM research
practices.”); Edward Parson & Lisa Ernst, International Governance of Climate
Engineering, 14 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 307, 324 (2013) (“[E]arly informal cooperation on
scientific research and risk assessment should seek to develop relevant norms from the
ground up, by a decentralized process.”); Stefan Schäfer et al., Field Tests of Solar Climate
Engineering, 3 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 766, 766 (2013) (“As a starting point, [adequate
governance for climate engineering research] could be achieved through the establishment of
an international voluntary code of conduct.”).
459.
See, e.g., MacCracken et al., supra note 129 (recommending governing principles
for the conduct of climate engineering research); see also BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER’S
TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE REMEDIATION, supra note 129 (advocating open and
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interdisciplinary research efforts); Rayner et al., supra note 129 (describing the Oxford
Principles as “high-level principles for geoengineering governance”).

